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I. INTRODUCTION 
The tenth anniversary of the September 11th terrorist attack has 
come and gone. For most Americans, the memories of the day remain 
etched in our minds, yet most have moved forward in the post-9/11 
world. However, for the first responders who spent weeks laboring in 
the wreckage of the collapsed towers, or “the Pile,” the ten-year 
anniversary marks more than the passage of time.
1
 It serves as another 
reminder that many 9/11 first responders are now suffering from 
illnesses associated with their service at Ground Zero. As we move 
further away from 9/11, the health consequences of Ground Zero 
exposure will manifest with increasing ferocity.
2
 
Enacted in 2011, the James Zadroga 9/11 Health and 
Compensation Act is a federal effort to alleviate the burden of 9/11 
 
1 9/11: Ten Years Later †CBS television broadcast Sept. 11, 2011) (featuring an update 
of the multiple award-winning documentary film, 9/11). 
2 Id. (interviewing Dr. David Prezant about the toxicity of the dust at Ground Zero). The 
film features the cancer battles of several New York City firefighters. 
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related-illness.
3
 The Zadroga Act established the landmark World Trade 
Center Health Program (“WTC Health Program”); this program 
provides first responders and survivors with medical care and health 
monitoring for a pre-determined list of diseases associated with Ground 
Zero exposure (hereinafter “the List”) and sets aside $4.3 billion to 
provide eligible individuals with medical monitoring and treatment for 
those health conditions specified on the List.
4
 The List primarily covers 
aerodigestive diseases, including “Chronic cough syndrome” and 
“Gastroesophageal reflux disorder,” better known as heartburn.
5
 But the 
List expressly precludes the one condition first responders are 
developing at an alarmingly high rate: cancer.
6
 
In April of 2011, the president of the New York City Firefighters 
Union commented: 
It’s a fact that New York City firefighters are dying of cancer in 
record numbers. We have buried 10 firefighters in just the last 15 
weeks, seven with cancer. On September 10 2001 they were young, 
healthy firefighters.
7
 
The number of Ground Zero responders lost to cancer has now 
surpassed the number of firefighters killed in the collapse of the Twin 
Towers.
8
 Every day, 9/11 responders are diagnosed with illnesses, 
 
3 James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-347, 124 
Stat. 3623 (2011) [hereinafter “Zadroga Act”]. 
4 Zadroga Act § 101 (amending Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. ch. 6A (2001) by 
adding §§ 3301-51 in order to establish the World Trade Center Health Program (current 
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300mm-300mm61 (2012)). Title II, which re-opens the Victim 
Compensation Fund to provide economic and non-economic compensation to eligible 
responders and survivors, is beyond the scope of this Article. Zadroga Act §§ 201-05 
(amending the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, 107 Pub.  L. No. 42, 
115 Stat. 230 (2001) in order to re-open the Victim Compensation Fund (VCF)); Anemona 
Hartocollis, 10 Years and a Diagnosis Later, 9/11 Demons Haunt Thousands, N.Y. TIMES, 
A20 (Aug. 10, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/10/nyregion/post-
traumatic-stress-disorder-from-911still-haunts.html?pagewanted=all&_moc.semityn.www. 
5 Zadroga Act § 101. 
6 Neil Tweedie, 9/11: The Toxic Legacy of the World Trade Center Attacks, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Sept. 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/september-11-attacks/8737674/911-the-toxic-
legacy-of-the-World-Trade-Center-attacks.html. 
7 See, e.g., id. 
8 See Sally Goldenberg & Susan Edelman, FDNY Cancer Up Post 9/11: Bravest’s Doc 
Bares Hero Risk, N.Y. POST (Apr. 3, 2011), 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/fdny_cancer_up_post_n4vfuHFoUROuJYtmyt4Y2K 
(citing a report from the NY State Health Department stating that 345 9/11 responders had 
died of cancer as of June 2010); see also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS 
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including cancers, typically found in persons decades older.
9
 
Unfortunately, it remains unclear if the Act will provide adequate 
medical coverage for cancer.  Under the Act, the WTC Health Program 
Administrator is only required to conduct a “Periodic Review” of the 
scientific literature to determine whether cancers should be added to the 
List—and cancer was again excluded during the first Periodic Review.
10
 
After the first Periodic Review, many felt that the data considered 
presented an incomplete picture of the health crises.  As a result of a 
bipartisan congressional petition to add cancer to the List, the 
Administrator is now conducting the second Periodic Review. In 
February of 2012, the WTC Health Program Scientific and Technical 
Advisory Committee (“STAC”), a panel created under the Act to assess 
emerging health issues found that it is “reasonable to expand” the WTC 
Health Program to cover cancer while research continues.
11
 
This recommendation does not guarantee that the WTC Health 
Program will be amended to include cancer treatment; it is purely 
advisory.
12
  The current Administrator, John Howard, M.D., M.P.H., 
J.D., L.L.M., will decide in the upcoming months if the WTC Health 
Program will (1) provide coverage for some cancers; (2) grant eligible 
individuals full cancer coverage; or (3) confirm its current exclusion, 
reserving the decision for a future Periodic Review.
13
 
Although the Act’s enactment was in and of itself a success, many 
first responders and advocates fear that truly adequate coverage will 
once again be denied.  The Daily Show’s host, Jon Stewart, credited by 
many for securing the Bill’s passage, captured these sentiments in his 
 
UPON THE UNITED States, Heroism and Horror 9.1 (2004) available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Ch9.htm [hereinafter COMMISSION 
REPORT] (stating the number of firefighters killed on September 11th was 343). 
9 Goldenberg & Edelman, supra note 8. 
10 James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-347, § 
3312(a)(3), 124 Stat. 3623 (2011). 
11 David B. Caruso, Feds Consider Expanding Cancer Coverage for WTC Workers: 
Advisory Committee Believes it Reasonable that Cancer Link Would Eventually be Found, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 17, 2012), available at http://www.jems.com/article/news/feds-
consider-expanding-cancer-coverage. 
12 Id. 
13 Press Release, N.Y. Representatives Carolyn Maloney, Jerrold Nadler, & Peter King, 
& Senators Charles Schumer & Kristin Gillibrand, NY Lawmakers Applaud Progress 
Toward Adding Cancer Coverage to WTC Health Program (Feb. 16, 2012), available at 
http://maloney.house.gov/press-release/ny-lawmakers-applaud-progress-toward-adding-
cancer-coverage-wtc-health-program. 
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episode, I Thought We Already Took Care of This S@#t: 
It took 9 years of committed legislators working tirelessly with first 
responder advocates, some of them sadly passing away before the 
Bill’s signing, to bring much needed relief to those who gave so 
much down at Ground Zero. . . . As it turns out, as part of a political 
compromise to get the [Zadroga] bill passed, the bill does not cover 
cancer treatments. . . how did we not include cancer?
14
 
This Article tackles this question through an in-depth analysis of 
the toxic exposure at Ground Zero, the political turmoil associated with 
the Zadroga Act, and the mechanics of the WTC Health Program. Part 
II outlines the toxic exposure at Ground Zero and explains the latent-
disease development in 9/11 responders and survivors. Part III details 
the political process leading to the Zadroga Act’s passage, offering 
insight into the contentious battles over cancer coverage. 
Part IV then provides an overview of the WTC Health Program 
and its various statutory requirements, including the required Periodic 
Reviews. Part V examines the current Periodic Review process, 
incorporating the most recent recommendations of the STAC and the 
WTC Health Program Administrator. This Article endorses the 
recommendation that, at a minimum, some form of cancer coverage 
must be included under the WTC Health Program’s umbrella of 
conditions. 
Part VI outlines a series of recommendations tailored to ensure a 
fair and equitable review process for the inclusion of cancer coverage. 
First, this Article argues that an official disease presumption may be 
warranted in the case of 9/11 toxic exposures. Second, in lieu of the 
current statutory standard, this Article also recommends that the  WTC 
Health Program Administrator adopt evidentiary criteria equivalent to 
the admissibility standard endorsed by the Restatement Third of Torts § 
28, Comment c. Comment c directs courts to admit non-peer reviewed 
evidence when litigation must occur before epidemiologic evidence of 
causation exists.
15
 The adoption of these recommendations will ensure 
an equitable review process for those first responders dependent on the 
Act for their medical care. 
 
14 The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: I Thought We Already Took Care of This S@#t, 
(Comedy Central television broadcast July 28, 2011) available at 
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-july-28-2011/i-thought-we-already-took-care-of-
this-s—t [hereinafter Daily Show 2]. 
15 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 28 cmt. c (2010). 
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II.  DUST & DISCLOSURE: THE AFTERMATH OF THE 
COLLAPSE 
The debris pile at what was once the WTC burned for three 
months, and during that time, first responders, recovery workers, and 
residents of local residential and commercial building communities 
were continually exposed to the fallout of the Twin Towers’ collapse.
16
 
Both buildings collapsed from the combined effects of the combustion 
of 90,000 liters of jet fuel, structural impact damage, reduced elevated 
temperature strength, and the bowing and buckling of the exterior walls 
under the redistributed gravity load.
17
 In a matter of seconds, the towers 
were transformed into 1,000,000 tons of rubble and a cloud of dust, 
debris, and smoke that blanketed lower Manhattan and western 
Brooklyn.
18
 Whether in the immediate aftermath or over the course of 
the clean-up process, any degree of exposure to the Pile was toxic 
exposure. The following sections examine the nature of this exposure 
and the resultant disease development. 
A. WTC Exposure: Pollutants versus the People 
1. The Exposed Populations 
The STAC identified three categories of exposed populations: (1) 
persons exposed during the initial collapse of the Twin Towers; (2) 
persons exposed to the re-suspension of dust and smoke during the first 
week; and (3) persons exposed to the re-suspension of dust and smoke 
during the subsequent weeks and months.
19
 
 
16 Philip Landrigan et al., Health and Environmental Consequences of the World Trade 
Center Disaster, 112 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 731, 731, 733 (2004). The Pile burned 
from September 11, 2001 until December 20, 2001. 
17 S.W. Banovic, The Role of Metallurgy in the NIST Investigation of the World Trade 
Center Towers Collapse, 59 JOM 22, 28 (2007), available at 
http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/jom/0711/banovic-0711.html. JOM was known as the 
Journal of Metals from 1949 to 1988, at which point it changed its name to JOM. It is a 
technical journal published by The Minerals, Metals & Materials Society. John Howard, The 
World Trade Center Disaster: Health Effects and Compensation Mechanisms, 16 J.L. & 
POL’Y 69, 71 (2007). 
18 Howard, supra note 17, at 71. John Howard, M.D., MPH, J.D., LLM is the current 
director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. He has held this 
position since 2002. Thomas W. Eagar & Christopher Musso, Why Did the World Trade 
Center Collapse? Science, Engineering, and Speculation, 53 JOM 8, 8-11 (2001). 
19 Elizabeth Ward, Ph.D., Petition on Cancer (Feb. 15, 2012), available at 
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Everyone present in the World Trade Center area during the attack 
falls into Category One.
20
 This includes an estimated 50,000 office 
workers and anyone simply passing through the WTC complex – up to 
40,000 people on any given day.
21
 In addition to those inside the 
complex, this category represents area businesses and their customers, 
commuters, and local and downwind residents.
22
 
Category One also includes the first responders who arrived on 
scene immediately following the attack.
23
 The New York City Police 
Department (“NYPD”) mobilized at an amazing rate, dispatching over 
800 police officers within the first twelve minutes.
24
 The Fire 
Department of New York (“FDNY”) was equally impressive, 
mobilizing its response within five seconds of the first plane hitting the 
North Tower.
25
  Division Chief for Lower Manhattan, Peter Hayden, 
explains, “[w]e had a very strong sense that we would lose firefighters 
and that we were in deep trouble, but we had estimates of 25,000 to 
50,000 civilians, and we had to try to rescue them.”
26
 Within fifteen 
minutes, approximately 235 firefighters were on scene from twenty-one 
engine companies, nine ladder companies, four of the FDNY elite 
rescue teams, the Hazmat team, and two elite squad companies.
27
 
When the second plane struck the South Tower seventeen minutes 
later, thousands of first responders were already on site working to 
evacuate the WTC.
28
 The South Tower collapsed approximately one 
hour later—it took only ten seconds for the tower to become a pile of 
rubble and dust.
29
 The North Tower fell thirty minutes after the South 
 
http://ia600805.us.archive.org/29/items/WorldTradeCenterStacMeetingPresentation-
Cancer/WardWTCSTAC_JDedit.pdf [hereinafter Petition on Cancer]. The categories were 
based in part on the work of Lioy et al. See Paul J. Lioy et al., The World Trade Center 
Aftermath and Its Effects on Health: Understanding and Learning through Human-
Exposure Science, 40 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 6876, 6878-85 (2006). 
20 Petition on Cancer, supra note 19. 
21 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8. 
22 Petition on Cancer, supra note 19. 
23 Id. 
24 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8 at 9.2. The attack on the North Tower was at 8:46 
a.m 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8 at 9.2.  It collapsed at 9:58 a.m. 
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Tower collapsed.
30
 From that point forward, thousands of firefighters, 
police officers, and Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 
personnel began working twenty-four hour shifts at Ground Zero.
31
 
The dust cloud began settling approximately twenty-four hours 
after the collapse.
32
  As rescue efforts intensified, people were exposed 
to this re-suspension of dust, smoke, and debris—these individuals are 
members of Category Two.
33
 Members include professional and 
volunteer rescuers, members of the outdoor and indoor cleanup crews, 
and the residents and workers located downwind of Ground Zero and in 
the Financial District.
34
 Category Two also covers the healthcare 
workers, members of the press, and city officials who continuously 
accessed the Pile in the first two weeks.
35
 Many of these individuals 
were present at Ground Zero within twenty-four hours of the attack, and 
therefore also qualify as members of Category One.
36
 
During the crucial Category One and Category Two exposure 
periods, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) did not collect 
dust and debris samples, nor did they compile data on the air-quality.
37
 
With the exception of asbestos testing, pollutant and toxin sampling did 
not begin until September 16, 2001.
38
 Even after the EPA began 
measuring for pollutants, the benchmarks applied to determine any 
potential health risks were inappropriate because they could not provide 
an accurate assessment.
39
 At the time, health-based benchmarks for an 
intense, short-term but highly toxic exposure did not exist; without 
established predictive factors, the EPA estimated the potentiality of 
 
30 Id. 
31 See id.; see also 9/11: Ten Years Later, supra note 1. 
32 Petition on Cancer, supra note 19. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts at Ground Zero, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 384, 392-
93 (2007) [hereinafter Eggen Ground Zero]; see also Steven Levin et al., Health Effects of 
World Trade Center Site Workers, 42 J. INDUS. MED. 545, 545 (2002). 
36 Id.; Petition on Cancer, supra note 19. 
37 Petition on Cancer, supra note 19. 
38 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT NO. 2003-P-00012, EPA’S RESPONSE TO THE 
WORLD TRADE CENTER COLLAPSE: CHALLENGES, SUCCESSES, AND AREAS FOR 
IMPROVEMENTS, 11 (2003), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2003/WTC_report_20030821.pdf [hereinafter EPA 2003 
Response]. 
39 Id. 
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harm using the benchmarks created for lifetime exposure.
40
 Equally 
problematic was the fact that more than one toxin was released at 
Ground Zero—the EPA’s benchmarks applied only to single-toxin 
exposure and could not accurately predict risk of harm associated with 
the combined effect of the various pollutants.
41
 Instead of releasing 
estimated risks, the EPA made no statements regarding the potential 
health harm of spending longer than one week on the Pile; this decision 
deprived members of Category One and Category Two of important 
health information.
42
 
The final category, Category Three, is comprised of persons 
exposed to the re-suspension of dust and smoke in the weeks and 
months following the attack.
43
 This population includes first responders 
who had been working at Ground Zero since 9/11, as well as the clean-
up and recovery workers who arrived in the subsequent weeks.
44
 
Category Three members were heavily involved in all aspects of debris 
removal, some reported spending as many as 900 hours on-site.
45
 
Recovery workers also handled the material at marine transport points 
and at the Fresh Kills Landfill in Staten Island, the final deposit point of 
all WTC wreckage and debris.
46
 Whether hauling material from the Pile 
to the deposit points or demolishing the damaged buildings in the WTC 
complex, Category Three workers were continuously on-site through 
December of 2001.
47
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 10-12. 
42 Id. 
43 Petition on Cancer, supra note 19, at 12. 
44 Id. See also Eggen Ground Zero, supra note 35, at 387-89. 
45 Q&A: Anthony DePalma, Environment and Conservation Reporter, N.Y. TIMES, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/ref/nyregion/depalma_qa.html (citing the statement of 
Reggie H, a first responder who reported spending over 900 hours at the Fresh Kills Landfill 
and also reported a diagnosis of thyroid cancer and multiple myeloma)[hereinafter DePalma 
Q&A]. See Eggen Ground Zero, supra note 35, at 387-89. 
46 See Eggen Ground Zero, supra note 35, at 388. 
47 See id.; see also EPA 2003 Response, supra note 38, at 35-36. 
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During the clean-up and recovery process, OSHA officials 
coordinated the dust suppression efforts.
48
 However, the STAC declared 
their efforts insufficient—recovery and cleanup workers did not even 
have respiratory protection during the process.
49
 Debris was transported 
in open-top trucks and barges, only occasionally using tarps to cover the 
debris.
50
 While New York City officials and the National Guard set up 
wash stations to wet-down the debris before leaving Ground Zero, 
reports differ regarding whether or not these procedures were 
consistently followed.
51
 
Category Three also encompasses the individuals living and 
working in the area surrounding Ground Zero.
52
 This includes an 
estimated 19,000 students, who were more likely susceptible to inhaling 
the dust because “[c]hildren inhale more air as compared to their body 
size than adults do’ and ‘they are close to the ground, which brings 
them in closer contact with higher concentrations of dust.’”
53
 
Acknowledgment of exposure and the risk of potential harm to 
Category Three populations has been the source of considerable 
controversy.
54
 Often frustrated by a lack of information, many residents 
 
48 See EPA 2003 Response, supra note 38, at 35-36. The majority of asbestos-
containing materials were found during the removal of the basement remnants of WTC 
Building 6. Nine of the 12 samples contained asbestos levels greater than 1%. A spot sample 
of pipe wrap from WTC 6 contained sixty-six percent amosite asbestos (often considered 
more harmful than chrysotile asbestos). Id. at 36. 
49 Petition on Cancer, supra note 19. 
50 See EPA 2003 Response, supra note 38, at 37-38. 
51 Id. at 37-38 & 37  n.12. 
52 See Eggen Ground Zero, supra note 35, at 388-89. 
53 Id. at 388-89 n.24. 
54 Ronald Spadafora, Firefighter Safety and Health Issues at the World Trade Center 
Site, 42 AM. J. INDUST. MED. 532, 533 (quoting John Henshaw, Assistant Secretary of Labor, 
OSHA). Congressman Jerrold Nadler has publicly fought against the exclusion of residents 
living north of Canal Street and in Brooklyn from the WTC Health Registry: 
I don’t care who decided, what was that based on other than arbitrary ruling?  
Was there a Star Trek type force field or a 3,000 foot high wall at Canal Street 
that prevented the toxins from going north of Canal Street or for that matter 
across the East River into Brooklyn?  Do we have any scientific basis for 
believing that a registry with that geographic boundary has any validity at all? 
See Assessing September 11th Health Effects: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On National 
Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations of the H. Comm. on Government 
Reform, 108th Cong. 24-25 (2004) [hereinafter Assessing September 11th Health Effects], 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108hhrg98999/pdf/CHRG-
108hhrg98999.pdf (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Congressional Representative for the 
8th District of New York during the Testimony of John Howard, Director, National Institute 
for Occupational Safety and Health). The boundary was set by the CDC, ATSDR, and New 
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questioned the area’s safety: 
I, too, wonder about possible health consequences for people who 
were in the area on 9/11 and returned to work the following week. I 
was on park row when the first building fell, and returned to work 
each day for months to a desk covered in grey dust. The ruins of the 
WTC were trucked to and loaded onto barges across the street from 
my office for months. My apartment, just above 14th street, was 
coated for weeks with a green, slimy dust. Why has no one even 
spoken about the possible effect on those who work downtown?
55
 
As evidenced above, returning to normal life after 9/11 was 
hampered by the lack of professional assistance in cleaning private 
homes and businesses. Unlike the professional recovery process at 
Ground Zero, described by OSHA’s Assistant Secretary of Labor as 
“potentially the most dangerous workplace in the United States,” area 
residents were personally responsible for cleaning their indoor spaces.
56
 
The EPA delegated responsibility for indoor air safety to the City of 
New York and did not assume responsibility for the cleanup of private 
residences until May of 2002.
57
 The EPA and the City of New York 
were heavily criticized for their inaction and inattention to the homes 
and businesses in Lower Manhattan, and the full extent of the harm to 
area residents and workers will likely be unknown for many years 
come.
58
 
2. Assessment of the Toxins 
The first responders serving at Ground Zero unknowingly placed 
their short-term and their long-term health in jeopardy.
59
 On September 
18, 2001, EPA administrator Christine Todd Whitman falsely stated that 
the New York City and Washington D.C. air was safe to breathe.
60
 
 
York City based on information provided by the EPA, NASA, and ATSDR. Id. 
55 DePalma Q&A, supra note 45(citing a comment from “Cynthia”). 
56 Spadafora, supra note 54, at 533. 
57 Eggen Ground Zero, supra note 35, at 400-02. 
58 Id. See Petition on Cancer, supra note 19. 
59 See Sharon E. Perlman et al., Short-term and Medium-term Health Effects of 9/11, 
378 THE LANCET 925, 925, 927-31 (noting the strong evidence for associations between 
exposure and respiratory illness, sarcoidosis, and gastrointestinal disease). 
60 EPA 2003 RESPONSE, supra note 38. A portion of the press release is as follows: 
We are very encouraged that the results for our monitoring air quality and drinking water 
conditions in both New York and near the Pentagon show that the public in these areas is 
not being exposed to excessive levels of asbestos or other harmful substances. Given the 
scope of the tragedy from last week, I am glad to reassure the people of New York and 
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Statements of this nature continued in the weeks following 9/11—yet 
these statements were made prior to testing for chemicals (other than 
asbestos), before any indoor air-quality data existed, and without 
policies and procedures for evaluating the results of such tests.
61
 
Once testing began, experts surmised that the Pile released toxins 
for at least six weeks.
62
 Speaking of the various types of pollutants, 
chemical engineering professor Thomas Cahill of the University of 
California at Davis noted, “[f]or each of these classes of pollutant, we 
recorded the highest levels we have ever seen in over 7,000 
measurements we have made of very fine air pollution throughout the 
world, including Kuwait [during the 1991 Gulf War oil fires] and 
China.”
63
 
The sudden collapse of the Twin Towers resulted in the 
simultaneous release of several classes of toxins into the atmosphere, 
including seventy known and potential carcinogens; fifteen of these 
toxins definitively cause cancer in humans, and the remaining toxins are 
listed as either “reasonably anticipated” to cause cancer or “probable 
and possible carcinogens.”
64
 The most common classes are discussed in 
the following Sections, each independently, as every toxin maintains its 
own risk of harm. 
 
 
Washington, DC, that their air is safe to breathe and their water is safe to drink. 
Press Release, EPA, Whitman Details Ongoing Agency Efforts to Monitor Disaster Sites, 
Contribute to Cleanup Efforts (Sept. 18, 2001), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/d2a3eb622562e96b85257359003d4809/ed368f43
303656488525744c00039488!OpenDocument. 
61 See Susan Ferraro, EPA Chief Says Water, Air are Safe, NYDAILYNEWS.COM, Sept. 
14, 2001, available at http://articles.nydailynews.com/2001-09-
14/news/18361409_1_ground-zero-christie-whitman-safe; see also EPA STATEMENT, EPA 
REGION II Press Release 3, January 17, 2002. See generally EPA 2003 Response, supra note 
38. 
62 John Herzfeld, Study Finds World Trade Center Debris Pile Emitted Dangerous Fine 
Particles for Weeks, 18 TOXICS L. REP. 938, 939 (2003) (referencing Prof. Thomas Cahill of 
Univ. of Cal. at Davis). 
63 Id. (quoting Thomas Cahill). 
64 WORLD TRADE CENTER SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE (STAC) 
RECOMMENDATION ON PETITION 001, April 2, 2012, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/wtc/pdfs/WTC_STAC_Petition_001.pdf [hereinafter 2012 
Recommendation]. 
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a) Asbestos 
Like many carcinogens, cancer caused by asbestos exposure can 
take years to manifest—hence, it is often used as the classic example of 
a latent toxic illness.
65
 Given its commonality in building materials, 
asbestos was the first toxin tested for by the EPA in the days following 
9/11, and the asbestos levels were found to be higher than those deemed 
safe by the EPA. In a draft of a press release prepared for distribution on 
September 16, 2001, the EPA stated: 
Seven debris and dust samples taken Thursday, showed levels of 
asbestos ranging from 2.1 percent to 3.3 percent. EPA views a 1 
percent level of asbestos as the definition for asbestos-containing 
material.
66
 
The issued press release was euphemistically modified to state: 
Debris samples collected outside buildings on cars and other surfaces 
contained small percentages of asbestos, [sic] ranging from 2.1 to 3.3 
– slightly above the 1 percent trigger for defining asbestos material.
67
 
Asbestos is most commonly associated with lung disease.
68
 
However, asbestos is a known carcinogen and numerous clinical and 
epidemiological studies have established causation between exposure 
and the development of cancers, most notably mesothelioma.
69
 Jean 
Macchiaroli Eggen, a leading toxic tort expert, has conducted extensive 
research on the WTC asbestos exposure and aptly summarizes the issue 
as follows: 
With regard to the asbestos content of WTC dust, several debates 
have ensued over its hazardous qualities. First, questions have arisen 
about the accuracy of the exposure estimates for the various 
populations. Because the amounts have varied depending upon 
location and time of sampling, data regarding exact exposures is 
nonexistent, and no clear parameters are available for generalizing to 
larger populations or different locations. Second, although longer 
asbestos fibers have been deemed to be more carcinogenic than 
 
65 Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Clinical Medical Evidence of Causation in Toxic Tort 
Cases: Into the Crucible of Daubert, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 369, 424 (citing Borel v. Fibreboard 
Paper Prods. Corp. 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973)). 
66 See EPA 2003 Response supra note 38, at 16-17. 
67 Id. 
68 AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR ASBESTOS § 1.5, 5-6 (2001), available at 
www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp.asp?id=30&tid=4. 
69 Id. 
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shorter fibers, a risk of serious illness exists for exposure to all types 
of asbestos.
70
 
Sprayed as a fireproof coating during construction, the asbestos detected 
in and around Ground Zero came directly from the steel skeleton of the 
Twin Towers.
71
 Experts conclude that recovery workers had 
unpredictable, intermittent exposure to asbestos, mostly the result of 
moving steel beams.
72
 
Since 9/11, there has been some debate as to whether or not the 
exposure was prolonged enough to cause harm.
73
 EPA representatives 
and several scientists have asserted that there are no health benchmarks 
for high-level asbestos exposure, and that exposure is not harmful if 
only for a limited duration.
74
 However, many other scientists and 
physicians disagree with this supposition; instead, they argue that the 
asbestos at Ground Zero was unique because it was pulverized into 
ultra-fine particles.
75
 Because a person’s lungs cannot eliminate particles 
of this size, the variable of temporal exposure is negated and even short-
term exposure may be harmful.
76
 Other scientists suggest that a risk 
remains despite the fact that the WTC asbestos, chrysotile asbestos, has 
smaller fibers; while larger fibers may cause more cellular damage than 
their smaller counterparts, small fibers penetrate the lung at a deeper 
level and with greater ease.
77
 As such, WTC toxic exposure experts 
 
70 Eggen Ground Zero, supra note 35, at 392-93 (cautioning that “no generalization can 
be made that the presence of smaller fibers means no threat to the health of those 
exposed.”). 
71 Philip J. Landrigan, The WTC Disaster: Landrigan’s Response 112 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSPECTIVE A607 (2004). 
72 Id. 
73 Compare, e.g., id., with R.P. Nolan et al., Risk Assessment for Asbestos-related 
Cancer from the 9/11 Attack on the World Trade Center, 47 J. OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. 
MED. 817, 817-25 (concluding that the cancer risk associated with asbestos exposure for 
residents of Lower Manhattan is less than one case over the lifetime of the population). 
74 Memorandum from Cate Jenkins, Ph.D., Envtl. Scientist, Envtl. Prot. Agency, on 
World Trade Center Asbestos to Lillian Bagus, Chief, Waste Identification Branch, Office 
of Solid Waste, Envtl. Prot. Agency & Robert Dellinger, Director, Hazardous Waste 
Identification Division, Office of Solid Waste, Envtl. Prot. Agency, 1, 9 (Dec. 3, 2001), 
available at http://old.911digitalarchive.org/objects/106.pdf. See also EPA 2003 Response, 
supra note 38, at 11. The EPA reported that “[h]ealth-based benchmarks for short-term and 
acute exposures did not exist for pollutants of concern resulting from the collapse of the 
WTC.” Id. 
75 Memo from Jenkins, supra note 74, at 9. 
76 Id. at 3, 9. 
77 Luz Claudio, Environmental Aftermath, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVE. A529, 
A531, A533 (November 2001) (citing Dr. Philip Landrigan, Chair of the Dep’t of 
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concur that harm from smaller fibers cannot be discounted.
78
 
b) Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons 
Although asbestos is the most openly debated toxin, it was not the 
only dangerous toxin released from the Pile in the weeks and months 
following 9/11. Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs) were 
released into the air when building materials and office contents, 
including tens of thousands of computers, were incinerated during the 
explosion.
79
 
According to the Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry 
(hereinafter ATSDR), PAHs are recognized as human carcinogens and 
are known to compromise the dermal, hepatic, and neurologic organ 
systems.
80
 PAHs are also associated with fetal harm.
81
 When inhaled 
during pregnancy, PAHs can cross the placental barrier and bind to the 
DNA of the fetus. 
82
 The Columbia Center for Children’s Environmental 
Health conducted a study to measure the PAH fetal exposure and found 
that newborns of mothers who were both pregnant on 9/11 and lived 
within two miles of Ground Zero had higher levels of PAH in their cord 
blood than would normally be expected.
83
 In a separate analysis of this 
same group of mothers, findings “suggest[] that the fetus may be 10-
fold more susceptible to DNA damage than the mother, and that in-
utero exposure to polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons may 
disproportionately increase carcinogenic risk.”
84
 
 
Community and Preventive Medicine at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine). 
78 Id. 
79 Eggen Ground Zero, supra note 35, at 390. 
80 AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR POLYCYCLIC AROMATIC HYDROCARBONS, § 1.5 
at 16 (1995), available at www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp69.pdf. Furthermore, in animal 
studies, inhaling, ingesting, or topically applying PAHs caused lung cancer, stomach cancer, 
or skin cancer, respectively. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TOXFAQS FOR PAHS (1996), available at 
www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaqs/TF.asp?id=121&tid=25. 
81 See generally Frederica P. Perera et al., Relationships Among Polycyclic Aromatic 
Hydrocarbon-DNA Adducts, Proximity to the World Trade Center, and Effects on Fetal 
Growth, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 1062 (2005). An “adduct” is formed in the cord 
blood and provides a biologic measure of toxin exposure. Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 See generally Frederica P. Perera et al., DNA Damage From Polycyclic Aromatic 
Hydrocarbons Measured by Benzo[a]pyrene-DNA Adducts in Mothers and Newborns From 
Northern Manhattan, the World Trade Center Area, Poland, and China, 14 CANCER 
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c) Lead, Mercury & Cadmium 
Lead, mercury, and cadmium were also detected in the pulverized 
computers.
85
 Lead, found in the solder on the computers’ circuit boards, 
is well established as a toxic substance, having been designated as a 
harmful substance by the EPA in 2000.
86
 Lead exposure is associated 
with nervous system disorders and poor blood levels in children, and it 
causes latent health effects because it remains in a person’s bones long 
after exposure.
87
 It is also a possible human carcinogen.
88
 
d) Polychlorinated Biphenyls 
Like PAHs and lead, the office content also produced 
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and chlorodifluoromethane, which 
were present in much of the electrical equipment.
89
 PCBs are known to 
affect the liver, endocrine system, immune system, reproductive system, 
and neurological system.
90
 The EPA, the International Agency for 
Research on Cancer, and the ATSDR have stated that PCBs are 
“probably carcinogenic to humans.” The limited studies available have 
associated PCBs with cancer of the liver and biliary tract.
91
 
e) Benzene 
Benzene, a toxin associated with combustion events, was released 
following the ignition of the towers’ plastics and polyvinyl chloride.
92
 A 
highly dangerous toxin, even brief exposure to benzene will cause 
 
EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 709, 709 (2005). 
85 Eggen Ground Zero, supra note 35, at 390 (citing Phil Mulkins, WTC Mercury Came 
from Computers, Lights, TULSA WORLD (Jan. 12, 2002), at 2). 
86 Eggen Ground Zero, supra note 35, at 395 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 48529d (2000) 
(authorizing the EPA to set regulations on lead-based paint). 
87 AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR LEAD § 2.2 (2007), available at 
www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp13.pdf. 
88 Eggen Ground Zero supra note 35, at 395. 
89 Id. at 391. 
90 AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR POLYCHLORINATED BIPHENYLS § 2.2 (2000), 
available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp17.pdf. 
91 AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., TOXFAQS FOR POLYCHLORINATED BIPHENYLS (2001), available at 
www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaqs/tf.asp?id=140&tid=26. 
92 Petition on Cancer, supra note 19. 
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serious health effects and possibly death; the acute health effects 
include dizziness, stomach irritation, rapid heart rate, and other 
neurological and cognitive symptoms, with the possibility of 
convulsions and coma.
93
 
Benzene has also been designated a known human carcinogen by 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the EPA, and the 
International Agency for Cancer Research.
94
  Long-term exposure 
disrupts blood cell production, and is associated with the development 
of leukemia.
95
 Epidemiological studies have also established a causal 
relationship between a person’s occupational exposure to benzene (and 
benzene-containing solvents) and the development of acute 
myelogenous leukemia.
96
 
According to the National Institute of Occupational Safety and 
Health (“NIOSH”), unsafe levels of benzene were detected in and 
around the Pile following 9/11.
97
 The Minimal Risk Level for acute 
inhaled exposure to benzene is 0.009 ppm, 0.004 ppm for intermediate 
inhalation, and 0.003 ppm for chronic inhalation.
98
 Researchers estimate 
that the benzene concentrations released during the combustion at 
Ground Zero were in excess of 100 ppb.
99
  When spot measurements 
were taken from the Pile following 9/11, benzene levels were recorded 
in excess of 1ppm.
100
  Measurable benzene spikes continued to occur 
well into 2002.
101
 
 
93 Eggen Ground Zero, supra note 35, at 396. 
94 AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR BENZENE § 1.5 (2007), available at 
www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp3.pdf. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at § 2.2. “These studies are ‘generally limited by confounding chemical exposures 
and methodological problems, including inadequate or lack of exposure monitoring and low 
statistical power (due to small number of cases), but a consistent excess risk of leukemia 
across studies indicates that benzene is the causal factor.’” Id. at § 3.2.1.7. 
97 Paul J. Lioy & Panos Georgopoulos, The Anatomy of the Exposures that Occurred 
Around the World Trade Center Site: 9/11 and Beyond, 1076 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF 
SCIENCES 54, 69 (2006). See Claudio, supra note 78, at A530. 
98 BENZENE TEACH CHEMICAL SUMMARY, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY § VI (2009), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/teach/chem_summ/BENZ_summary.pdf. 
99 Lioy & Georgopoulos, supra note 97, at 69 (2006). See Claudio, supra note 77, at 
A530. 
100 Id. 
101 Robin Herbert et al., The World Trade Center Disaster and the Health of Workers: 
Five-Year Assessment of a Unique Medical Screening Program, 114 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSPECTIVES 1853, 1853 (2006). 
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B. WTC Health Conditions: Ten Years Later 
Even with the most advanced science, we do not yet know what the 
wicked concoction of dust, ash, and toxic materials did when it 
landed deep inside the heaving lungs of responders. We don’t know 
how it short-circuited their immune systems or toyed with their 
genes. And we won’t know for years if it combined with other 
poisons to speed up or exacerbate carcinogenic attacks on the bodies 
of people who were coated with it.
102
 
Although insufficient time has passed for some diseases to 
manifest, uncontroverted evidence proves that WTC exposure is 
associated with chronic physical illnesses, including cardiovascular 
disease, hematological malignancies with short latency periods, and 
respiratory disease.
103
 Within forty-eight hours of the attack, 90 percent 
of firefighters and EMS workers reported respiratory symptoms—
symptoms which later became labeled the “World Trade Center 
Cough.”
104
 In an effort to document the health consequences associated 
with Pile exposure, the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) created 
the WTC Medical Screening and Treatment Program in October of 
2001 and evaluated over 10,000 first responders during the program’s 
first four months.
105
 This program provided excellent comparative data 
because the FDNY had access to the records of their firefighters’ pre-
9/11 health examinations.
106
 Federally funded by the Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention (“CDC”) and NIOSH, this program screened 
well over 14,000 FDNY employees by 2007.
107
 
 
 
 
102 ANTHONY DEPALMA, CITY OF DUST: ILLNESS, ARROGANCE, AND 9/11, 5 (1st ed. 
2010). 
103 See Hannah T. Jordan et al., Mortality Among Survivors of the Sept 11, 2001, World 
Trade Center Disaster: Results from the World Trade Center Health Registry Cohort, 328 
THE LANCET 879, 879 (2011). 
104 David J. Prezant et al., Cough and Bronchial Responsiveness in Firefighters at the 
World Trade Center Site, 347 NEW ENGLAND J.MED. 806, 806-15 (2002). Lisa Zamosky, A 
Legacy of Illnesses from 9/11, LATIMES.COM (Sept. 5, 2011), available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/05/health/la-he-911-wtc-cough-20110905. 
105 Long Term Health Impacts from September 11: A Review of Treatment, Diagnosis 
and Monitoring Efforts, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On Health, Education, Labor, 
and Pensions 110th Cong. 110-197 (Mar. 21, 2007) (statement of Kerry Kelly, Chief 
Medical Officer, New York City Fire Department). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
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In 2002, the CDC helped fund Mount Sinai School of Medicine’s 
Center for Occupational Environmental Medicine.
108
 The Federal 
Occupational Health Service followed suit in 2003 in order to screen the 
health of federal responders.
109
 In 2003, The World Trade Center Health 
Registry was created in order to centralize the health information 
collected by these various agencies.
110
 By 2004, the Registry obtained 
baseline data on 14,665 residents, 2,646 students and school workers, 
30,665 responders, and 43,487 others.
111
 
The health information collected demonstrated the seriousness of 
WTC exposure, especially regarding respiratory function.
112
 For 
example, within one year of 9/11, dramatic declines in lung function 
were detected among firefighters, including nonsmokers.
113
 In testimony 
before Congress, FDNY Chief Medical Officer, Kerry J. Kelly, 
testified: 
When we compared our first responders’ pulmonary functions during 
the first year after 9/11 to the annual change in pulmonary functions 
in the five years prior to 9/11, we observed a significant decline in 
those functions, with the magnitude of the decline correlating to the 
member’s initial time of arrival at Ground Zero.
114
 
Seven years after 9/11, quadruple the number of firefighters had 
below-normal lung function for their respective age groups.
115
 The rate 
of decline in lung capacity is eleven times greater than the average rate 
of decline associated with the normal process of aging.
116
 
 
 
 
108 Assessing September 11th Health Effects, supra note 54, at Prepared Statement of 
John Howard, 20-21. This program screened over 15,000 individuals by 2006. Eggen 
Ground Zero, supra note 35, at 401. 
109 Eggen Ground Zero, supra note 35, at 401. 
110 Id. at 402. 
111 Progress Since 9/11: Protecting Public Health and Safety Against Terrorist Attacks: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Security, Emerging Threats and International 
Relations of the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 883-84 (2006) [hereinafter 
Progress Since 9/11](testimony of Kerry J. Kelly, FDNY Chief Medical Office). 
112 See id. 
113 WORLD TRADE CENTER MEDICAL WORKING GROUP OF NEW YORK CITY, 2010 
ANNUAL REPORT ON 9/11 HEALTH 3 (2010) [hereinafter WTC ANNUAL REPORT]. 
114 Progress Since 9/11, supra note 111, at 80-81 (emphasis added). 
115 T.K. Aldrich, et. al., Lung Function in Rescue Workers at the World Trade Center 
After Seven Years, 362 NEW ENGLAND J. MED 1263, 1263 (2010). 
116 Progress Since 9/11, supra note 111, at 81. 
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As of 2010, approximately 50,000 rescue and recovery workers, 
New York City residents, and office workers in the New York area have 
enrolled in 9/11 health programs, most often exhibiting asthma, sinus 
problems, and loss of lung function.
117
 Additionally, multiple studies 
have confirmed a causal link between WTC exposure and the 
development of sarcoidosis and gastroesophageal reflux symptoms.
118
 
1. Latent-Illness Development 
Illnesses with short latency periods have already been positively 
linked to WTC exposure.
119
 However, cancer from toxic exposure takes 
years to manifest because it has a long latency period—only with the 
ten-year anniversary behind us are we beginning to see this type of 
disease development.
120
 
Published almost exactly ten years after 9/11, the 2011 Zeig-
Owens study is the first study causally linking exposure to WTC toxic 
dust with the development of cancer.
121
 In this study, researchers 
evaluated the association between 9/11 exposure and the development 
of cancer within seven years of 9/11.
122
 According to the study’s lead 
author, firefighters with Ground Zero exposure have a 19 percent higher 
risk of developing cancer than their colleagues who were not exposed to 
the toxic fallout.
123
 
 
 
 
117 WTC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 3. 
118 Id. at 4. See, e.g., Lorna E. Thorpe, Health Consequences of the World Trade Center 
Disaster: A 10 Anniversary Perspective 306 JAMA 1133, 1133-34 (2011). 
119 See Hannah T. Jordan et al., Mortality Among Survivors of the Sept 11, 2001, World 
Trade Center Disaster: Results from the World Trade Center Health Registry Cohort, 328 
THE LANCET 879, 879-81 (2011). 
120 See id. at 879. 
121 See, e.g., Rachel Zeig-Owens et al., Early Assessment of Cancer Outcomes in New 
York City Firefighters after the 9/11 Attacks; An Observational Cohort Study, 378 THE 
LANCET 898, 903-04 (2011). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 904 (“This excess of cancer cases remained after correction for possible 
surveillance bias and after classification of cancers occurring only in 2005 or later as 
potentially related to WTC-exposure”). In an interview with CNN, Dr. David Prezant, the 
study’s lead author, further explained, “‘We excluded cancers that might have been 
diagnosed early (that may have existed before the attack) . . . and we still see a 19% 
increase . . . When we put those cancers back in, we see a 32% increase.”‘ Stephanie Smith, 
Firefighters Responding to 9/11 at Increased Cancer Risk, CNN (Sept. 2, 2011), available 
at http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/09/01/911.firefighters.cancer/index.html. 
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Although this is a critical first study, the research team 
acknowledges that there is more work ahead: 
We remain cautious in our interpretation of these findings because 
the time interval since 9/11 is short for cancer outcomes, the 
recorded excess of cancers is not limited to specific sites, and the 
biological plausibility of chronic inflammation as a possible 
mediator between WTC-exposure and cancer outcomes remains 
speculative.
124
 
Dr. Philip Landrigan, director of the September 11 Treatment, 
Monitoring, and Research Program at Mount Sinai Medical Center 
summarized the need for continued research: “[w]e know full well that 
the responders were exposed to a whole soup of carcinogens . . .  We’re 
all looking for a signal today, but we’re anticipating that the signal will 
get stronger in the years ahead.”
125
 
Despite the need for a cautious outlook, many families of fallen 
firefighters see this study as much needed validation.
126
 The wife of 
deceased New York City firefighter and multiple myeloma victim, Roy 
Chelsen, commented: “[i]n time, research will prove that [his death was 
caused by chemicals at Ground Zero], but in medicine, everything is 
evidence-based. He wouldn’t have died at 51, that’s for sure.”
127
 
2. The Financial Burden of Managing WTC-Illnesses 
Prior to the enactment of the Zadroga Act, the availability of 
funding for World Trade Center Health Programs was both intermittent 
and unpredictable.
128
 For example, some grants would cover funding for 
physical conditions, but not mental health conditions, while others 
would cover monitoring, but not treatment. Notably, several NIOSH 
grants awarded to the FDNY and Mt. Sinai Programs covered health 
 
124 Zeig-Owens et al., supra note 121, at 904. 
125 Sydney Ember, Study Suggest Higher Cancer Risk for 9/11 Firefighters, N.Y. TIMES, 
A17 (Sept. 1, 2011),  available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/health/research/02cancer.html?_r=0. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. Trish Chelsen described her firefighter husband as a “typical Viking” prior to 
chemotherapy and two stem-cell transplants. 
128 See id. See generally LLOYD DIXON & RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN, RAND INSTITUTE 
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES FROM THE 9/11 ATTACKS (2004) (outlining 
the policies, programs, and sources of funding). 
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monitoring, yet excluded all treatment costs.
129
 
Yet, the demand for medical care continued to rise—in 2006, the 
City of New York estimated the cost to evaluate and treat all those 
affected by the WTC attacks to be in excess of $392 million, per year, 
for the foreseeable future.
130
 This estimate did not account for the 
additional cost to treat any late-emerging, chronic conditions, such as 
cancer, nor did the estimate include increased pension and disability 
costs associated with the 9/11 attacks.
131
 As such, the financial burden of 
medical treatment weighs not only on families, but on the city and state 
governments as well. 
The Zadroga Bill is desperately needed to assuage the increased 
burden on the FDNY and NYPD pension systems. The post-9/11 
demand for accidental disability pensions is causing a “dramatic 
financial impact on the FDNY pension system”—conservative estimates 
report that the increased financial impact of 9/11-related illnesses is 
over $826 million.
132
 This figure is based on those respiratory, 
musculoskeletal, and psychological-related accidental disability 
retirement claims made after 9/11 and before 2008.
133
 Given the 
temporal limitations, experts estimate that the cost of WTC-associated 
 
129 WORLD TRADE CENTER HEALTH PANEL, ADDRESSING THE HEALTH IMPACTS OF 9/11: 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO MAYOR MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG 17 n.39 (2006). 
130 Id. at 5. 
131 Id. 
132 J.K. Niles et al., Impact of the World Trade Center Attack on Firefighter Retirement, 
Disabilities, and Pension Benefits, 54 AM. J. INDUSTRIAL MEDICINE 672, 678-80 (2011).  Had 
the WTC attack not occurred, the estimated funds necessary to cover disability retirement 
benefits was $926. Id. “Estimates based on actual numbers and types of retirement and 
actual over-time for these members after the WTC amounted to $1,752.8.” Id. at 677-78. 
133 Id. at 679. A limited number of cancer pension claims are included in the financial 
analysis for the following reasons: 
Before 2006, cancer-related accidental disability retirements were awarded to 
active firefighters who developed a disabling cancer under the ‘‘Cancer Bills.’’ 
There has been no significant increase in the number of ‘‘Cancer Bills’’ 
awarded post-9/11, and, as a result, we excluded ‘‘Cancer Bills’’ from the 
financial impact analysis. However, in 2006, the ‘‘WTC Bills’’ broadened 
eligibility to include members developing cancer after retirement. ‘‘WTC Bills’’ 
granted for cancer-related illnesses have been deemed WTC-related by the 
FDNY Pension Board, and are, therefore, included in all analyses. 
Id.  Given the latent nature of cancer, an increase in WTC –related cancer would not be 
expected prior to 2006. John Howard, First Period Review of Scientific and Medical 
Evidence Related to Career for the World Trade Center Health Program, 2010 NAT’L 
INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 40 [hereinafter First Periodic 
Review]. 
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illnesses will continue to disproportionately burden the pension system 
as latent illnesses manifest over time.
134
 
Many non-city employees and first responders now living out-of-
state receive little to no health coverage for their 9/11-related 
conditions.
135
 For example, in the wake of 9/11, many retired FDNY 
firefighters returned to volunteer at Ground Zero.
136
 If a retiree now lives 
outside of New York, treatment for a 9/11-related illness is not covered 
by insurance because out-of-state doctors are “out of network” for 9/11-
related conditions.”
137
 Additionally, if a city worker is not eligible for a 
disability pension (e.g., he or she was part-time or temporary), his or her 
private insurance will not cover 9/11-associated illness because it is 
considered a work-related claim; therefore, any coverage linked to a 
health condition attributed to time spent working at Ground Zero will be 
denied.
138
 Under the Zadroga Act, however, individuals in the above-
described circumstances will be eligible for coverage through the WTC 
Health Program.
139
 
III. INCONSISTENT HEALTHCARE FUNDING AND THE 
TROUBLED PATH TO THE ZADROGA ACT 
In 2004, recognizing the need for continued funding, U.S. 
Representative Carolyn Maloney of New York introduced legislation to 
reopen the Victim’s Compensation Fund (“VCF”).
140
 After this effort 
failed, a second attempt came in the form of the James Zadroga Act of 
2006, jointly introduced by Representative Maloney and Senator Robert 
Menendez of New Jersey.
141
 This legislation, which again failed to pass, 
would have reopened the VCF for those who became ill after the 
deadline and extended eligibility to those who were exposed later than 
the first ninety-six hours.
142
 The bill was poignantly named for James 
 
134 Id. at 678. 
135 See e.g., Parija Kavilanz, Some 9/11 First Responders Get Help – and Some Don’t, 
CNNMONEY (Sept. 6, 2011), available at  
http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/02/news/economy/911_health_insurance/index.htm. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-347, 
124 Stat. 3623 (2011). 
139 Id 
140 H.R. 5076, 108th Cong. (2004). 
141 H.R. 6045, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 3891, 109th Cong. (2006). 
142 A third failed attempt to secure funding occurred in 2006 when Representative 
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Zadroga, the first New York City Police officer whose death was 
directly attributed to the toxic chemicals at Ground Zero.
143
 
A. The Zadroga Act’s Namesake 
Although off-duty on 9/11, Detective Zadroga returned to the city 
after the first plane struck the Twin Towers.
144
 According to his own 
testimony, he arrived just after the towers collapsed, was caught in the 
dust cloud resulting from the collapse of Building 7, and worked 
securing buildings, serving in the bucket brigade, and recovering human 
remains.
145
 
Zadroga testified: 
The dust so thick you couldn’t read your partner’s shield standing 
next to you, your eyes burning, itching, and the smell, oh, the smell. 
We started looking for survivors or even bodies, but the soot was so 
thick you couldn’t tell if you were standing on a piece of steel or a 
human arm. The dead silence was eerie, and the dust looked as if it 
was snowing. . . . After being down at Ground Zero for some 20 
hours over 40 hours without sleep, I headed back to the base covered 
from head to toe in dust and gray mud, my feet soaking wet and my 
eyes and skin itching and burning.
146
 
Detective Zadroga was exposed to what experts have deemed the 
“heaviest and most dangerous dust” for over three weeks.
147
 In October 
of 2002, his lung capacity was half of what it had been prior to 9/11; he 
was seriously ill by 2003 and therefore qualified under the VCF.
148
 He 
passed away in 2004 at the age of thirty-four. After his death in 2004, 
the medical examiner concluded “with a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty that the cause of death in this case was directly related to the 
 
Jerrold Nadler introduced the 9/11 Comprehensive Health Benefits Act of 2006. The bill 
would have amended title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide Medicare benefits to 
individuals with physical and mental conditions associated with WTC exposure. However, 
this bill was also voted down. H.R. 6046, 109th Cong. (2006). 
143 DEPALMA, supra note 102, at 185. 
144 Id. at 181. 
145 James Zadroga, The Pain of 9/11 & the Days After: Detective James Zadroga’s 
Statement to the 9/11 Commission, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (Oct. 22, 2009) 
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/pain-9-11-days-det-james-zadroga-statement-9-11-
commission-article-1.386753. 
146 Id. 
147 DEPALMA, supra note 102, at 181. 
148 Id. at 181-82. 
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9/11 incident.”
149
 
In 2007, Dr. Charles Hirsch, a veteran of the New York City 
Medical Examiner’s Office, re-reviewed the autopsy report and 
concluded that the death was caused by the presence of cellulose and 
talc granulomas in his lungs, the result of self-injection of prescription 
drugs.
150
 According to Detective Zadroga’s family, he did use 
prescription drugs for pain relief purposes during the end of his life. 
A third forensic pathologist, Dr. Michael Baden, one of the 
nation’s leading forensic pathologists, disagreed with Hirsch’s 
conclusion. He determined that the areas in question on the autopsy 
slides were packed so closely together that it was equally possible that 
the dust was in the alveoli and blood vessels—meaning the dust had 
been inhaled, not injected.
151
  However, the ruling by Hirsch remained 
and therefore prevented Zadroga’s name from being inscribed on the 
9/11 memorial.
152
 In October of 2008, the Commissioner of the New 
York City Police Department presented Distinguished Service Medals 
to James Zadroga’s family and the families of seven other officers who 
had died of illness after serving at Ground Zero—the decision to do so 
clearly demonstrated the Police Department’s position regarding the 
root cause of Detective Zadroga’s death.
153
 
The considerable disagreement associated with Zadroga’s case 
infuriated many people, ranging from WTC first responders to members 
of Congress, all wondering “what difference it made—after all, Zadroga 
unquestionably had been exposed to the dust.”
154
 Whatever else it may 
have been, this conflict served as a bell-weather of what was to come 
the next time the issues of causation and compensation were broached. 
B. H.R. 847 
In 2009, Representative Maloney introduced H.R. 847, a bill to 
provide funding for the monitoring and treatment of Ground Zero 
workers; the bill once again honored Zadroga as its namesake.
155
 Before 
its enactment in December of 2010, H.R. 847 went through seven 
 
149 Id. at 183. 
150 Id. at 230-31. 
151 Id. at 232-33. 
152 DEPALMA, supra note 102, at 237. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 233 (emphasis added). 
155 Id. at 236-38. 
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revisions. In its original form, the James Zadroga 9/11 Health and 
Compensation Act appropriated $3.2 billion dollars over the next eight 
years to monitor and treat WTC-exposure related illness, with New 
York City paying 10 percent of the costs and the federal government 
covering the remainder.
156
 The WTC Program Administrator had 
authority to promulgate regulations to add an illness or health 
condition.
157
 
In promulgating such regulations, the WTC Program Administrator 
shall take into account the findings and recommendations of Clinical 
Centers of Excellence published in peer reviewed journals in the 
determination of whether an additional illness or health condition, 
such as cancer, should be added to the list of identified WTC-related 
health conditions for eligible WTC responders.
158
 
It also set aside $4.2 billion to reopen the September 11th VCF.
159
  
Considerable debate ensued, with Republicans describing the bill as an 
“irresponsible overreach,” and Democrats calling a rejection “heartless 
and unpatriotic.” The bill fell short of the two-thirds margin required for 
passage on July 29, 2010.
160
 
On September 29, 2010, the House passed a revised H.R. 847 by a 
vote of 268 to 160.
161
 Two critical changes were made in order to make 
this possible. First, as a political compromise to ensure the Bill’s 
passage, cancer was specifically excluded from the List, and the 
procedure for the addition of cancer was changed to the following: 
The WTC Program Administrator shall periodically conduct a 
review of all available scientific and medical evidence, including 
findings and recommendations of Clinical Centers of Excellence, 
published in peer-reviewed journals to determine if, based on such 
 
156 H.R. 847, 111th Cong. (2009) (as introduced by House, Feb. 4, 2009); see also 
Raymond Hernandez, Plan to Aid 9/11 Victims is Rejected in the House, N.Y. TIMES, July 
29, 2010, at A20, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/30/nyregion/30zadroga.html. 
157 H.R. 847, 111th Cong. § 3012(a)(4)(A) (2009). 
158 Id. (emphasis added). 
159 Id.. See also Hernandez, Plan to Aid 9/11 Victims is Rejected in the House, supra 
note 156, at A20. 
160 Hernandez, Plan to Aid 9/11 Victims is Rejected in the House, supra note 156, at 
A20. 
161 Raymond Hernandez, House Passes Measure to Help With 9/11 Health Care, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2010, at A32, available at 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/911-health-care-bill-passes/. Seventeen 
Republicans voted in favor of the bill and three Democrats were opposed. Id. 
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evidence, cancer or a certain type of cancer should be added to the 
applicable list of WTC-related health conditions. The WTC Program 
Administrator shall conduct the first review under this subparagraph 
not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this title.
162
 
Second, Title III was added as a means to fund the program, imposing a 
limitation on treaty benefits for certain deductible payments under 
Section 894 of the Internal Revenue Code.
163
 The bill was received in the 
Senate on September 29, 2010. Threatening a filibuster, Senate 
Republicans rejected a procedural move, which would have brought the 
bill to a vote in early December 2010.
164
 In response, Senate Democrats 
reduced the cost and proposed Amendment 4923, which would fund the 
project with two foreign tax increases: (1) increased visa fees
165
 and (2) a 
two percent tax on foreign contractors.
166
 
C. Jon Stewart and Shepard Smith Step In 
Seven significant revisions, including the political compromise to 
exclude cancer, were not enough to overcome the filibuster.
167
 Political 
analysts agree that Jon Stewart and Shepard Smith were largely 
responsible for the passage of the Act.
168
 When it looked as though the 
 
162 H.R. 847, 111th Cong. § 3312(a)(5)(A) (as passed by House, Sept. 29, 2009). See 
Anemona Hartocollis, Not Enough Evidence to Link 9/11 & Cancer, a Federal Report Says, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2011), at A20. 
163 H.R. 847, 111th Cong. § 301(d)(1): 
In the case of any deductible related-party payment, any withholding tax 
imposed under chapter 3 (and any tax imposed under subpart A or B of this 
part) with respect to such payment may not be reduced under any treaty of the 
United States unless any such withholding tax would be reduced under a treaty 
of the United States if such payment were made directly to the foreign parent 
corporation. 
164 Raymond Hernandez, Republicans Block U.S. Health Aid for 9/11 Workers, N.Y. 
TIMES Dec. 9, 2010, at A28, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/nyregion/10health.html (quoting Mayor Bloomburg 
criticizing Republicans for their “wrongheaded political strategy”). 
165 H.R. 847, 111th Cong.  § 302 (2009). 
166 Id. at § 301. 
167 Id.; Hartocollis, 10 Years and a Diagnosis Later, 9/11 Demons Haunt Thousands, 
supra note 4. 
168 See Onika K. Williams, How Jon Stewart and Lady Gaga Made Congress Less 
Lame: The Impact of Social Media on the Passage of Bills Through the “Lame Duck” 
Session of the 111th Congress and Beyond, 87 IND. L.J. SUPP. 17, 17-19 (2012); see also Ari 
Shapiro, Jon Stewart’s Latest Act: Sept. 11 Responders Bill, NPR (Dec. 26, 2010), available 
at http://www.npr.org/2010/12/26/132310870/jon-stewarts-latest-act-sept-11-responders-
bill. 
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bill would not be passed, an unexpected champion emerged: the host of 
The Daily Show, Jon Stewart. The evening after Senate Republicans 
blocked the Bill, Stewart devoted his entire show to the Zadroga Bill.
169
 
Foregoing his usual satire, Stewart blasted Senate Republicans for 
blocking the bill, calling it “an outrageous abdication of our 
responsibility to those who were most heroic on 9/11.”
170
 He criticized 
CBS, NBC, ABC, and Fox News for failing to even mention the 
Zadroga Bill and interviewed a panel of New York City First 
Responders, all of whom have cancer, about their reactions to the 
filibuster.
171
 
The next day, Fox News anchor Shepard Smith agreed with 
Stewart: 
Who’s going to hold these people’s feet to the fire? . . . Do people 
know what this city was like that day? People were . . . covered in 
ash, they were running for their lives, they were crying, their family 
members were dead. And these people ran to Ground Zero to save 
people’s lives. And we’re not going to even give them medicine for 
the illnesses they got down there? It’s disgusting, it’s a national 
disgrace, it’s a shame and everybody who voted against should have 
to stand up and account for himself or herself.
172
 
When many Senate Republicans promised to block legislation until 
the stalemate over tax cuts resolved, Smith proceeded to name, on air, 
those lawmakers who refused to explain on air why they were blocking 
the Bill. 
173
 He then questioned Senator Tom  Coburn’s motive for 
 
169 Senate Republicans Block 9/11 Health Bill, REUTERS (Dec. 9, 2010, 8:33 PM), 
available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/10/us-usa-congress-firefighters-
idUSTRE6B903120101210. The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: 9/11 First Responders React 
to Senate Filibuster (Comedy Central television broadcast Dec. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-december-16-2010/9-11-firstresponders-react-
tothe-senate-filibuster [hereinafter Daily Show 1]. 
170 Daily Show 1, supra note 169. 
171 Id. Only Al Jazeera covered the Bill. 
172 Shepard Smith Unloads on Blockers of 9/11 Responders Bill: ‘How Do They Sleep 
At Night?’ HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/18/shepard-smith-911-first-responders-
bill_n_798625.html. 
173 See, e.g., Colby Hall, Shep Smith Calls Out Sen. Coburn Over His Threat to Block 
9/11 First-Responders Bill, MEDIATE.COM (Dec. 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.mediaite.com/tv/shep-smith-calls-out-sen-coburn-over-911-first-responders-
bill/. 
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vowing to block the bill until the Congressional session ended.
174
 The 
advocacy of Stewart and Shepard accomplished what nine years of 
legislative skirmishing could not; within one week, the Zadroga Bill 
was passed.
175
 
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER HEALTH 
PROGRAM 
The passage of the Zadroga Act ensures a steady flow of funding 
for the medical monitoring and treatment of WTC-related health 
conditions through 2016, if funding remains available.
176
 As enacted, the 
Zadroga Act sets aside $4.3 billion to compensate, monitor, and treat 
both responders and survivors of the 9/11 attacks through the 
establishment of the WTC Health Program.
177
 Title II re-opens the VCF 
to provide economic and non-economic compensation to eligible 
responders and survivors; the Act allots $2.775 billion for new VCF 
claims, of which $875 million may be spent in the first five years.
178
 
 
 
174 Id. See also Phil Milazo, How Jon Stewart & Shep Smith Got the 9-11 First 
Responders Bill Passed, MILAZZ ON POLITICS (Jan. 24, 2011), 
http://milazzonpolitics.com/2011/01/24/how-jon-stewart-shep-smith-got-the-9-11-first-
responders-bill-passed/ (including links to the video of Shepard Smith calling out Tom 
Coburn).  Shepard Smith stated on air: 
This is the picture of Senator Tom Coburn, Republican from Oklahoma . . . he 
is the man who is trying to slow this down or block it, so that the 
necessary  funding for the illnesses of the first responders who made it to 
Ground Zero to try to save lives on the day that America changed, remember? 
This is the senator who is vowing to block it, so that it doesn’t make it through: 
Senator Tom Coburn, Republican of Oklahoma. 
Id. 
175 The Bill passed on December 22, 2011. Jonathan Karl & Matthew Jaffe, 
EXCLUSIVE: Senate Strikes Deal on 9/11 First Responders Bill, ABC NEWS (Dec. 22, 
2010), available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/exclusive-senate-strikes-deal-911-
responders-bill/story?id=12459170. 
176 See generally James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-347, 124 Stat. 3623 (2011). 
177 Id. at § 205; Hartocollis, 10 Years and a Diagnosis Later, 9/11 Demons Haunt 
Thousands, supra note 4, at A20. 
178 Zadroga Act § 205. A more comprehensive analysis of Title II is beyond the scope 
of this Article. 
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A. World Trade Center Health Program Objectives and 
Operations 
Title I of the Zadroga Act expands the Public Health Service Act, 
adding “Title XXXIII – WORLD TRADE CENTER HEALTH 
PROGRAM” to the end of the Act.
179
 Section 3301 sets forth two 
program objectives: (1) to provide medical monitoring and treatment 
benefits to eligible emergency responders and recovery and cleanup 
workers (including federal employees) who responded to the terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center, and (2) to provide initial health 
evaluation, monitoring, and treatment benefits to eligible residents and 
other building occupants and area workers who were directly impacted 
and adversely affected by such attacks.
180
 Additionally, the WTC Health 
Program Administrator, in consultation with the WTC 
Scientific/Technical Advisory Committee, or STAC, must conduct or 
support research on conditions, diagnoses, and the treatment of WTC-
related health conditions.
181
 The research must include epidemiologic 
studies on WTC-related health conditions or emerging conditions 
among enrolled WTC responders and eligible survivors.
182
 
The WTC Health Program is not an insurance program nor does it 
require any cost sharing on the part of the participants.
183
 It is considered 
a federal health program, established within the Department of Health 
and Human Services, satisfying the requirements of a federal health 
program as defined by Section 1128B(f) of the Social Security Act.
184
 It 
is also considered a federal health plan for the purposes of applying 
Sections 1128 through 1128E, also of the Social Security Act.
185
 As 
such, the Health and Human Services Inspector General is required to 
develop and implement both a fraud prevention program and an 
oversight program to guard against unreasonable administrative costs.
186
 
 
179 Id. at sec. 101, § 3301 (amending Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. ch. 6A 
(2001) by adding §§ 3301-51 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300mm-300mm61 (2012))). 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. (Research must extend as far north as 14th Street in Manhattan and in Brooklyn 
and must include control groups.). 
183 Id. at sec. 101, § 3301(c). 
184 Id. at sec. 101, § 3301(d). 
185 James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-347, 
sec. 101, § 3301(d), 124 Stat. 3623 (2011). 
186 Id. at sec. 101, § 3301(d)(1), (2). 
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B. Eligibility 
The WTC Health Program provides eligibility requirements, which 
are considerably more liberal than those in the original VCF, which 
limited eligibility to those who worked at the site within a set number of 
hours after the attack.
187
 It has set a limit of 25,000 enrollees, not to 
include those already considered an identified responder, or an 
individual who has previously been identified as eligible for care 
coordinated by Mt. Sinai, NIOSH, and the FDNY.
188
 
The Zadroga Act distinguishes between responders and survivors. 
Section 3311 defines responders as members of the FDNY; law 
enforcement, rescue, recovery, and cleanup workers; and those first 
responders to the Pentagon and Shanksville, PA sites.
189
 To qualify for 
care as a firefighter, the individual must have been a member, active or 
retired, of the FDNY at the time of the attack.
190
 He or she must have 
participated for at least one day in the rescue or recovery effort at 
Ground Zero, at Fresh Kill—the Staten Island landfill, or the NYC 
Medical Examiner’s Office during the period between September 11, 
2001 and July 31, 2002.
191
 The Zadroga Act also includes surviving 
immediate family members of an FDNY firefighter who was killed at 
the WTC on September 11, so long as they received any treatment for a 
WTC-related mental health condition on or before September 1, 2008.
192
 
The requirements are slightly more stringent for law enforcement 
(NYPD, Port Authority of NY, or New Jersey Police), rescue, recovery, 
and cleanup workers.
193
 To be eligible, an individual must have worked 
or volunteered in rescue, recovery, or debris cleanup in lower 
Manhattan below Canal Street, the Staten Island Landfill, or the barge 
loading piers for one of the following: (1) for at least 4 hours between 
September 11 and September 14, (2) for at least 24 hours between 
September 11 and September 30, or (3) for at least 80 hours between 
 
187 LLOYD DIXON & RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN, COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES FROM THE 
9/11 ATTACKS 21 (2004). 
188 Zadroga Act sec. 101, § 3311(a)(4)(A). 
189 Id. at sec. 101, § 3311(a)(2)(A)-(C). 
190 Id. at sec. 101, § 3311(a)(2)(A). 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-347, 
sec. 101, § 3311(a)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 3623 (2011). 
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September 11, 2001 and July 31, 2002.
194
 The Act also includes 
provisions for survivors, defined as persons who were living or working 
near the sites, based on the individual’s temporal and geographic 
relationship to Ground Zero.
195
 
In order for an eligible responder to receive treatment through the 
WTC Health Program, he or she need only demonstrate physician 
documentation that he or she is suffering from a health condition 
included on the List of identified WTC-related conditions. The List 
divides conditions into two groups: aerodigestive disorders
196
 and mental 
health conditions.
197
 Musculoskeletal disorders, including lower back 
pain or repetitive stress injuries, are included for those responders who 
worked at Ground Zero on or before September 11, 2003.
198
 
C. Treatment under the World Trade Center Health Program 
The scope of treatment covered by the WTC Health Program 
includes physician services, diagnostic and laboratory tests, inpatient 
and outpatient prescription drugs, and inpatient and outpatient hospitals 
services.
199
 Section 331 provides that all costs of the initial health 
evaluation, monitoring, and medical treatment for eligible individuals is 
paid for by the WTC Health Program from the WTC Health Program 
Fund, except for any costs paid by a (1) health insurance program or (2) 
workers’ compensation program. For eligible beneficiaries with private 
health insurance, the WTC Health Program acts as a secondary payer of 
all uninsured costs, including co-pays and deductibles, for covered 
 
194 Id. at sec. 101, § 3311(a)(2)(B)(i). 
195 Id. at sec. 101, § 3321(a)(1)(B). 
196 Id. at sec. 101, § 3312(a)(3)(A) (covering (1) Interstitial lung diseases; (2) Chronic 
Respiratory Disorder –Fumes/Vapors; (3) Asthma; (4) Reactive Airways Dysfunction 
Syndrome (RADS); (5) WTC-exacerbated chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD); 
(6) Chronic Cough Syndrome; (7) Upper airway hyperreactivity; (8) Chronic rhinosinusitis; 
(9) Chronic nasopharyngitis; (10) Chronic laryngitis; (11) Gastroesophageal Reflux 
Disorder (GERD); and (12) Sleep apnea exacerbated by or related to the above conditions). 
197 Id. at sec. 101, §3312(a)(3)(B) (covering (1) Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD); 
(2) Major Depressive Disorder; (3) Panic Disorder; (4) Generalized Anxiety Disorder; (5) 
Anxiety Disorder (not otherwise specified); (6) Depression (not otherwise specified); (7) 
Acute Stress Disorder; (8) Dysthymic Disorder; (9) Adjustment Disorder; and (10) 
Substance Abuse). 
198 Id. at sec. 101, § 3312(a)(4). 
199 James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-347, 
sec. 101, § 3312(b)(4)(A), 124 Stat. 3623 (2011). 
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services.
200
 Payment for work-related conditions is reduced or recouped 
by any amounts paid under a workers’ compensation law or plan.
201
 
However, a health care entity is not required to seek reimbursement 
from a health plan with which it does not have a contract for 
reimbursement.
202
 
V. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW SET FORTH IN THE ACT IS 
INFEASIBLE 
A. The Zadroga Act Should Incorporate Presumptions 
In order to receive treatment, the burden of proof is on the eligible 
responder to provide documentation from a medical professional with 
“experience in treating or diagnosing the medical conditions” on the 
List, and also to provide documentation that the World Trade Center 
attack is “substantially likely to be a significant factor in aggravating, 
contributing to, or causing an individual’s illness or health condition.”
203
 
Because the party seeking compensation must meet the above-
specified burden of proof, the conditions on the List are not 
“presumptive diseases.”
204
 The Zadroga Act’s requirement is an unusual 
 
200 Id. at sec. 101, § 3331(c)(1). 
201 Id. at sec. 101, § 3331(b)(1). 
202 Id. at sec. 101, § 3331(c)(2). 
203 Id. at sec. 101, § 3312(a)(2). “[S]ubstantially likely to be a significant factor in 
aggravating, contributing to, or causing an individual’s illness or health condition” is 
determined by an assessment of: 
(A) The individual’s exposure to airborne toxins, any other hazard, or any other 
adverse condition resulting from the attacks. . .(i) [as] evaluated and 
characterized through the use of a standardized, population-appropriate 
questionnaire approved by the Director of National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health; and (ii) assessed and documented by a medical professional 
with experience treating or diagnosing health conditions included on the list of 
WTC-related health conditions. . .[and] (B) The type and temporal sequence of 
symptoms . . .(i) assessed through the use of a standardized, population-
appropriate medical questionnaire approved by the director of National Institute 
for Occupational Safety Health and a medical examination; and (ii) diagnosed 
and documented by a medical professional with experience in treating or 
diagnosing health conditions on the list of WTC-related health conditions. 
204 The United States Department of Veterans Affairs recognizes presumptive diseases, 
in which certain health conditions are assumed to be related to Agent Orange exposure 
during qualifying military service. See COMM. ON EVALUATION OF THE PRESUMPTIVE 
DISABILITY DECISION-REVIEW MAKING PROCESS, INST. OF MED., IMPROVING THE 
PRESUMPTIVE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR VETERANS G1-G2 (Jonathan M. Samet & 
Catherine C. Bodurow eds., 2008). 
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stipulation in this type of compensation program. The Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA) compensation program, which operates similarly, 
has used presumptions in its legislation since 1921.
205
 Legally, a 
presumption is a procedural device dictating that “once basic fact A is 
established, the existence of fact B must be assumed unless the 
presumed fact is rebutted.”
206
 A disease presumption operates to bridge 
the gap between available scientific data and medical knowledge. The 
VA provides disability compensation for certain medical conditions 
appearing after a veteran’s military service because the condition is 
presumed to be caused by or “aggravated by an exposure or an event 
that occurred during military service.”
207
 This alleviates the burden on 
the veteran to prove that his or her medical condition, often cancer, was 
causally connected to the exposure and that the exposure occurred 
during the veteran’s military service.
208
 
Presumptions are established by Congress and the VA because 
they promote fairness and equitable outcomes.
209
 By streamlining and 
simplifying the adjudication process, presumptions ensure that similarly 
situated claimants receive comparable relief.
210
 It is also less 
burdensome on both the claimant and the VA because causation does 
not require adjudication, as the probability of the presumed fact is 
already high. 
Presumptions are often the product of public policy decisions.
211
 
“Medical health outcome presumptions have generally been adopted 
after periods of war and have been driven by the concerns of and for 
returning Service members.”
212
 The reasoning is in part the result of the 
unpredictability of military service; service members often do not know 
to which toxins they will be exposed.
213
 “Presumptions may [also] 
implement policy judgments that the burdens arising in certain cases be 
borne by the government rather than the veteran claimants.”
214
 This 
 
205 Id. at 27. 
206 Id. at 36-37. 
207 Id. at 39. 
208 Id. at 37. 
209 See INST. OF MED., supra note 204, at 37-39. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 40. 
213 Id. at 39. 
214 Id. (quoting D. E. Zeglin, Presumptions of Serv. Connection (2006) (prepared for the 
Veterans’ Disability Benefits Commission)). 
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occurs in spite of the “uncertainty surrounding the issue of whether the 
claimants’ disabilities were, in fact, incurred or aggravated by 
service.”
215
 For instance, when epidemiologic information, such as 
exposure data, “is unavailable because it was not collected at the 
relevant time,” a presumption can be created to relieve the claimant’s 
burden of proof.
216
 The circumstances justifying VA presumptions are 
analogous to those following the 9/11 attack—exposure to a 
conflagration of so many different toxins had never been anticipated or 
studied, no exposure data was collected in that critical first week, and 
the data that was obtained after is of questionable accuracy.
217
 
Finally, presumptions are created because they provide an ethical 
way to demonstrate “gratitude and sympathy for those who served their 
country.”
218
 These principles are also shared by state legislatures, as 
thirty-four states, including New York and New Jersey, have some type 
of presumption in place for the coverage of respiratory illness in 
firefighters.
219
 Under New Jersey Law, the Lindquist court held that the 
legislative intent of the firefighter pension program is social good and 
is, therefore, to be interpreted as expanding, rather than limiting 
coverage.
220
 Thus, a petitioner’s burden of proof is less than in a 
common-law tort action.
221
 In New York City, the Firefighters Cancer 
Bill includes a presumption that any cancer is presumed to be the result 
of occupational exposure.
222
 In 2005, The New York State Retirement 
and Social Security Law began providing those who worked during the 
WTC rescue, recovery, or clean up with a disability pension per the 
World Trade Center Accidental Disability Presumption Law.
223
 Under 
the Cancer Bill, the city now presumes any cancer is related to 9/11 
exposures if a patient meets the set criteria for 9/11-related service.
224
 
 
215 INST. OF MED., supra note 204, at 40. 
216 Id. at 37. 
217 Petition on Cancer, supra note 19. 
218 INST. OF MED., supra note 204, at 37-40. 
219 See Lindquist v. City of Jersey City Fire Dep’t, 814 A.2d 1069, 1092 (N.J. 2003). 
220 Id. at 1092. 
221 Id. (“The absence of peer-reviewed epidemiological studies does not, as defendants 
contend, make it ‘almost impossible’ for Dr. Smith’s opinion to be admissible.”). 
222 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 207-kk, (McKinney 1999). 
223 WORLD TRADE CENTER ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY PRESUMPTION, A LAW AFFECTING 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE WORLD TRADE CENTER SITE RESCUE OR 
CLEAN UP OPERATIONS, available at 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/retire/publications/vo1834.htm. 
224 Id. 
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The moral economy associated with the debt felt toward 9/11 first 
responders has been a consistent argument for the inclusion of cancer 
treatment under the umbrella of covered conditions. When the Zadroga 
Act went into effect on July 1, 2010, Representative Maloney voiced 
her relief that gratitude and recompense were finally being given to 9/11 
first responders: 
To the living victims of 9/11, we have great news: today, the 
Zadroga Act is taking effect and 9/11 health clinics are officially 
open for business under the new law. This is an historic milestone for 
the more than 36,000 people who have become ill because of the 
terrible events of 9/11, and the fulfillment of our moral obligation to 
care for those who rise to the defense of our nation in a time of 
war.
225
 
Although gratitude and recompense are cornerstones of the 
Zadroga Act, experts agree that proving causation is always “a 
contentious process, both scientifically and politically.”
226
 Both the Gulf 
War health debate and the effort required to institute the Agent Orange 
presumption are evidence of the challenges associated with achieving a 
scientific and political compromise.
227
 Unfortunately, the nine-year 
struggle to pass the Zadroga Act demonstrates that neither a plea to 
conscience nor an appeal to patriotism will be sufficiently persuasive to 
force the creation of a disease presumption or the inclusion of cancer 
coverage. Advocates must instead rely on the available scientific data to 
prove a presumption is warranted. Yet, unlike other federal 
compensation programs, the language of the Zadroga Act establishes an 
unreasonable admissibility standard for scientific evidence. As enacted, 
any decision regarding the inclusion of cancer is contingent on whether 
or not the Administrator finds the available peer-reviewed data 
sufficient to establish a causal link between WTC exposure and 
cancer.
228
 The following Section explains why this limitation is 
 
225 Press Release, Congresswoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Reps. Maloney, Nadler & 
King Celebrate As Zadroga 9/11 Health Law Goes Into Effect Today (July 1, 2011), 
available at http://maloney.house.gov/press-release/reps-maloney-nadler-king-celebrate-
zadroga-911-health-law-goes-effect-today. 
226 Mark Brown, Toxicological Assessments of Gulf War Veterans, 361 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS OF ROYAL SOC’Y OF LONDON BIOLOGICAL SCI. 649, 649-79 (2006). Brown is 
with the US Department of Veterans Affairs, Office of Public Health and Environmental 
Hazards. 
227 Id. 
228 James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-347, 
sec. 101, § 3312(a)(5)(A), 124 Stat. 3623 (2011). This Section requires the Administrator of 
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inequitable. 
B. The Admissibility Standard for the Periodic Reviews is 
Unreasonable 
Sir, clearly you have cancer, and clearly you spent a heroic amount 
of time sifting through a smoldering smorgasbord of carcinogens in 
search of your own loved ones and colleagues, and the loved ones 
and colleagues of others. But how do I know your cancer isn’t from 
dental x-rays and red M&Ms? So if you just give me 20 years, I think 
we’ll be able to have some statistics and then that’s that.
229
 
 
- Jon Stewart 
 
When making a determination to add a health condition to the List, 
admissible evidence is limited to that which has been published in a 
peer-reviewed scientific or medical journal.
230
At the time WTC Health 
Program Administrator John Howard conducted the first Periodic 
Review in July of 2010, the only published, peer-reviewed, 
epidemiological study on cancer was the Zeig-Owens study.
231
  He 
therefore was forced to conclude that “insufficient evidence exist[ed] to 
propose a rule to add cancer” to the List.
232
 
The Act permits the Administrator to collect evidence from the 
following three information sources: 
 A systematic search was conducted for peer-reviewed 
findings on exposure and cancer resulting from the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that have been 
published in the scientific and medical literature between 
September 11, 2001 and July 1, 2011. 
 Findings and recommendations related to cancer were 
 
the WTCHP to: 
[P]eriodically conduct a review of all available scientific and medical evidence, 
including findings and recommendations of Clinical Centers of Excellence, 
published in peer-reviewed journals to determine if, based on such evidence, 
cancer or a certain type of cancer should be added to the applicable list of 
WTC-related Health conditions. 
229 Daily Show 2, supra note 14. 
230 Zadroga Act sec. 101, § 3322(a). 
231 Id. See also First Periodic Review, supra note 133 (stating that the only peer-
reviewed study was the Zeig-Owens study). 
232 First Periodic Review, supra note 133. 
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solicited from the WTC Clinical Centers of Excellence and 
Data Centers, the WTC Health Registry at the New York 
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, and the 
New York State Department of Health. 
 Information from the public about cancer was solicited 
through a Request for Information published in the Federal 
Register on March 8, 2011 and March 29, 2011.
233
 
However, as the Act expressly limits evidence to “only the 
scientific and medical evidence that is published in peer-reviewed 
journals,” the Administrator could not consider the non-peer-reviewed 
data received as a result of solicitation in the Federal Register.
234
 For 
example, the following evidence, submitted by Bill Romaka, Uniformed 
Firefighters Association Sergeant-at-Arms/Health and Safety Officer, 
was not eligible for official consideration even though it was submitted 
in response to the NIOSH Docket #227 request for information on 
conditions relating to cancer: 
[L]et’s recap our most recent past. 4 firefighters/fire officers 
diagnosed with Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma and 1 with Leukemia in 
the LAST THREE WEEKS!!! 8 of the last 10 FDYNY WTC-
Related Line of Duty Deaths in the last few months (as determined 
by independent doctors and the Pension Board made up of 
government and union representatives) were all assigned to 
Manhattan fire companies and worked on 9/11.
235
 
Similarly, the World Trade Center Health Registry program is 
expected to release its third health survey of approximately 68,000 
people, including many rescue and recovery workers however, this 
study may not be available for inclusion in the review because it will be 
published at approximately the same time as the periodic review 
deadline.
236
 
The requirement that the Administrator’s review be confined to 
published peer-reviewed studies is unreasonable because it is too soon 
to have an established body of scientific literature on the latent effects 
 
233 Id. at iii. 
234 Id. at 29 (emphasis in original). 
235 E-mail from Bill Romaka, Uniformed Firefighters Association Sergeant-at-
Arms/Health and Safety Officer, to Karen E. Dragon, NIOSH Docket Office (CDC), (Mar. 
28, 2011, 03:06 PM EST) (on file with author) (Romaka is a member of the WTC Medical 
Monitoring and Treatment Steering Committee). 
236 See Sarah Dorsey, For Post-9/11 Responders, Illness, Frustration Lingers, CHIEF 
LEADER: UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION (Nov. 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.ufanyc.org/cms/contents/view/11962. 
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of Ground Zero exposure.
237
 When establishing scientific causation, 
researchers must compare the cancer rate in the affected population 
against the rate in the general population, a process taking at least two 
to three years.
238
 When insufficient time has passed for an adequate 
number of studies, any data will present an incomplete picture; when 
the “observation period is shorter than the average time that it takes for 
cancer to develop biologically following exposure (i.e., latent period), 
an excess of cancer cases would not be expected to be seen.”
239
 
At the time of the first Periodic Review, an insufficient amount of 
time had passed to produce a significant body of research.
240
 Of all of the 
studies conducted, only one peer-reviewed epidemiological study had 
been published within the past five years.
241
 In other words, only one 
peer-reviewed study had been published within the appropriate time 
frame to evaluate latent-illness. Ignoring the temporal impossibilities, 
NIOSH, which administers the WTC Health Program, determined that 
too few studies had been published to prove that WTC exposure causes 
cancer.
242
 Therefore, the Administrator was forced to conclude that the 
first Periodic Review showed insufficient peer-reviewed evidence to 
support a causal connection between exposure at Ground Zero and the 
latent development of cancer.
243
 
 
 
 
 
237 First Periodic Review, supra note 133, at 29. 
238 Dorsey, supra note 236. 
239 First Periodic Review, supra note 133, at 27. 
240 Jacqueline Moline et al., Health Consequences of the September 11 World Trade 
Center Attacks: A Review, 24 CANCER INVESTIGATION 294 (2006); Jacqueline Moline et al., 
Multiple Myeloma in World Trade Center Responders: A Case Series, 51 J. OCCUPATIONAL 
ENVTL. MED. 896, 897 (2009); Robert P. Nolan, Risk Assessment for Asbestos-Related 
Cancer From the 9/11 Attack on the World Trade Center, 47 J. OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. MED. 
817 (2005); Sierra Rayne, Using Exterior Building Surface Films to Assess Human 
Exposure and Health Risks From PCDD/Fs in New York City, USA, After the World Trade 
Center Attacks, 127 J. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 33 (2005); Jonathon M. Samet et al., The 
Legacy of World Trade Center Dust, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2233 (2007). 
241 See generally id. 
242 Dorsey, supra note 236. 
243 First Periodic Review, supra note 133, at 40. 
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1. The Purpose and Weight of the February 2012 
STAC Recommendation 
In September of 2012, a bipartisan group of nine Congressmen and 
Congresswomen formally petitioned for cancer’s addition to the List.
244
 
In accordance with the Act, the Administrator requested that the WTC 
Health Program STAC review the available information and “provide 
advice on whether to add cancer, or a certain type of cancer, to the 
List.”
245
 Howard asked the committee to consider the report from the 
first Periodic Review and the study by Zeig-Owens.
246
 
When the STAC met on February 15th & 16th, 2012, members 
evaluated all available epidemiologic data and found the Zeig-Owens 
study particularly important because this work represents the only 
assessment of latent health conditions in a specific study population.
247
 
Previous studies relied on qualitative or semi-quantitative data obtained 
from exposure questionnaires, often completed by the study participants 
themselves.
248
 Zeig-Owens and colleagues assessed 9,853 men who were 
employed as firefighters on January 1, 1996, 8,927 of whom were 
WTC-exposed.
249
 Every firefighter in the study had health information 
 
244 Letter from John Howard, WTCHP Administrator, to Elizabeth Ward, Chair 
WTCHP-STAC (Oct. 5, 2012) , available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/NIOSH/topics/wtc/stac/pdfs/LTRWard.pdf [hereinafter Letter from 
Howard]. Jonathan Lemire, Zadroga Act Should Cover Cancer Care for Bravest who 
Worked Ground Zero: Lawmakers, N.Y. DAILY NEWS Sept. 7, 2011, available at 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-09-07/news/30147050_1_zadroga-act-cancer-care-
lung-cancer. 
245 Letter from Howard, supra note 244. 
246 STAC Email Traffic During Preparatory Work on Report for Petition 001-Cancer-
03/22/12 (Mar. 22, 2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/wtc/stac/; 2012 
Recommendation, supra note 64. See Petition on Cancer, supra note 19. 
247 Petition on Cancer, supra note 19; Zeig-Owens et al., supra note 121, at 898-99. 
248 James M. Melius, Medical Care for Workers Exposed to the WTC Disaster, 378 THE 
LANCET 854, 854-55 (2011). 
249 Zeig-Owens et al., supra note 121, at 898-99. The researcher’s methodology is 
summarized as follows: 
We assessed 9853 men who were employed as firefighters on Jan. 1, 1996. On 
and after 9/11, person-time for 8927 firefighters was classified as WTC-
exposed; all person-time before 9/11, and person-time after 9/11 for 926 non-
WTC-exposed firefighters, was classified as non-WTC exposed. Cancer cases 
were confirmed by matches with state tumour [sic] registries or through 
appropriate documentation. We estimated the ratio of incidence rates in WTC-
exposed firefighters to non-exposed firefighters, adjusted for age, race and 
ethnic origin, and secular trends, with the US National Cancer Institute 
Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results (SEER) reference population. 
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available prior to 9/11, and each received careful follow-up in the post-
9/11 years.
250
 
Also relevant is a forthcoming study by the Mount Sinai School of 
Medicine, as it reports a 14 percent increase in cancer rates among 
rescue workers, including prostate, thyroid, and blood cancers.
251
 
Unfortunately, as this study is in the process of being published, it is not 
yet eligible for official consideration. In addition to epidemiologic data, 
the STAC members reviewed the carcinogens present at the WTC site.
252
 
Similar to the process used by the VA, the STAC also used exposure 
data to evaluate potential cancer risk; it also examined the composition 
of the dust and smoke at Ground Zero.
253
 This information, combined 
with epidemiologic studies and the known mechanisms of 
carcinogenesis, led to the unanimous conclusion that the addition of 
cancer is not unreasonable.
254
 
The STAC released the final version of their recommendation to 
the Administrator on March 31, 2012.
255
  Several options were proposed 
for determining which cancers to add, the most limited being a case-by-
case review of every eligible cancer victim.
256
 Other members proposed 
creating a tailored list of cancers commonly associated with toxic 
exposure or even including all cancers because of the “limited 
epidemiological data available to identify specific cancers.”
257
 While 
presumably less costly and time consuming, a narrowly-tailored List 
risks excluding some of those who are entitled to care.
258
 
 
 
 
 
[Cancer incidences] were estimated with overdispersed Poisson models. 
Additionally analyses included corrections for potential surveillance bias and 
modified cohort inclusion criteria. 
250 Id. 
251 See, e.g., Sally Goldenberg, 40 K Came to Help at WTC Site, N.Y. POST (Feb. 28, 
2012), 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/came_to_help_at_wtc_site_t4RlyYSaQU79z84OANU
eEP. 
252 Petition on Cancer, supra note 19. 
253 Id. 
254 Caruso, supra note 11. 
255 2012 Recommendation, supra note 64. 
256 Caruso, supra note 11. 
257 2012 Recommendation, supra note 64, at 2. 
258 Id. 
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After much discussion, “the committee agreed to proceed by 
generating a list of cancers potentially related to WTC exposures” based 
on three sources of evidence: 
1. Cancers with limited or sufficient evidence in humans based on the 
International Agency for Research (IARC) Monographs reviews 
for carcinogens present at the WTC site; 
2. Cancers arising in regions of the respiratory and digestive tracts 
where WTC-related inflammatory conditions have been 
documented; and 
3. Cancers for which epidemiologic studies have found some 
evidence of increased risk in WTC responder and survivor 
populations
259
 
The STAC committee recommended coverage for malignant 
neoplasms of the respiratory system, skin cancers, mesothelioma, 
ovarian, urinary tract, eye and orbit, thyroid cancer, lymphatic, and 
hematopoietic cancers.
260
 They also recommended the coverage of all 
childhood cancers; in other words, all cancers diagnosed before age 
twenty-one should be covered if a health care provider confirms a 
“substantial likelihood of association with World Trade Center 
exposures.”
261
 
However, it is critical to note that any opinion is just that, an 
opinion; under the Act, the Administrator is not obligated to even 
include the recommendation in his decision-making process.
262
 When the 
final decision is made by the Administrator, it is not unreasonable to 
anticipate opposition to finding causation on limited epidemiologic 
evidence—cancer coverage will ultimately add a financial burden to the 
federal budget. After STAC’s vote to include cancer, VCF Special 
Master Sheila Birnbaum cautioned that if cancer victims are included, 
“everyone would still get paid, but they would get paid less than they 
were awarded, and we all may run out of money.”
263
 The VCF is 
 
259 Id. 
260 Id. at 2-3. 
261 Id. at 26. 
262 First Periodic Review, supra note 133, at 28-29. 
263 Sarah Frier, Victim Funds for Sept. 11 Should Cover Cancer, Panel Chief Says, 
BUSINESSWEEK.COM (Feb. 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-16/victim-funds-for-sept-11-should-cover-
cancer-panel-chief-says.html#p1. Sheila Birnbaum is an attorney at Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
Meagher & Flom LLP in New York. 
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allocated $2.8 billion for the reimbursement of non-medical losses.
264
 
Birnbaum also commented that she would be willing to cover cancer 
patients if a second treatment fund covered the cost of their medical 
expenses.
265
 A final recommendation from Administrator Howard was 
due midsummer of 2012.
266
 
2. The Zadroga Act Does Not Provide Guidance to the 
Administrator on Weighing Evidence 
The Zadroga Act does not include issues such as public policy, the 
cost of cancer treatment, or resource allocation as factors for the 
Administrator to consider when making his final determination.
267
 
Rather, the Administrator’s decision is supposed to reflect the scientific 
evidence published in peer-reviewed literature.
268
 The statutory 
language, however, is too vague; it does not provide the Administrator 
any guidelines for weighing evidence other than the prohibition against 
non-peer-reviewed evidence. It gives no indication on how the 
Administrator should evaluate the evidence to determine which, if any, 
cancer will be added to the List.
269
 
 
 
264 Bloomberg News, Cancer Coverage Would Decrease 9/11 Victim Payouts, 
CRAINSNEWYORK.COM, (Feb. 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20120215/HEALTH_CARE/120219938&utm_sourc
e=Daily%2BAlert&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Newsletters. 
265 Id. 
266 David B. Caruso, Feds Consider Expanding Cancer Coverage for WTC Workers: 
Advisory Committee Believes it Reasonable that Cancer Link Would Eventually be Found, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 17, 2012), available at http://www.jems.com/article/news/feds-
consider-expanding-cancer-coverage; 
Once the Administrator receives the Advisory Committee’s recommendation he 
has 60 days to publish in the Federal Register either a notice of proposed 
rulemaking regarding the recommendation or a determination not to propose a 
rule and the basis for that determination. If the Administrator publishes a notice 
of proposed rulemaking to add cancer, or certain types of cancer, to the List of 
WTC-Related Health Conditions, the WTC Health Program must follow the 
normal regulatory process, including a minimum 30 day public comment period 
and review of those comments, before issuing a final rule. 
Next Steps: WTC Health Program - Statement from WTC Program Administrator John 
Howard, M.D., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Apr. 2, 2012), 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/wtc/stacpetition001.html. 
267 See generally James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-347, 124 Stat. 3623 (2011). 
268 Id. 
269 Id. 
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In the first Periodic Review, Howard noted that the lack of 
guidance was challenging, stating that although “‘weight of the 
evidence’ is a common term in the risk assessment literature, . . . it can 
have different meanings and applications.”
270
 Howard’s report provided 
a cursory reference to the Persian Gulf War Veterans Act, which defines 
a positive association between exposure and illness as one in which “the 
association is equal to or outweighs the credible evidence against the 
association.”
271
 However, this language reflects general scientific 
principles and does not apply when insufficient time prevents the 
completion of multiple epidemiological studies.
272
 
Given the lack of guidance and the Act’s limitation on admissible 
evidence, there is a clear need for an improved decision-making 
framework. The following section explains the evidentiary guidelines 
set forth in the Restatement Third’s discussion of toxic tort law and 
recommends that the Administrator be permitted to adopt a comparable 
decision-making framework. 
VI. APPLYING TOXIC TORT JURISPRUDENCE TO ENSURE 
THE PERIODIC REVIEW PROCESS IS FAIR AND EQUITABLE 
Given the contentious history of the Zadroga Act, any decision by 
the Administrator to cover cancer must be supported by sufficient 
evidence.
273
 At the same time, the Periodic Review process must also 
guarantee a fair and equitable consideration of all reliable scientific and 
medical evidence. 
This Article proposes the review process be modeled after toxic 
tort jurisprudence. Reflecting current standards of evidentiary 
admissibility, both the Restatement Third of Torts Section 28, Comment 
c and recent case precedent outline a comprehensive review process 
designed to evaluate all reliable evidence, including, but not limited to, 
 
270 Id. 
271 First Periodic Review, supra note 133, at n.7. 
272 See INST. OF MED., supra note 204, at G1, G2. 
273 Although colorful, it is unlikely that Jon Stewart’s suggestion on this issue will pass 
muster: 
So if you’re someone who spent time on the Pile, I don’t care if you ate 200 
sweet n low packets a day sprinkled on your favorite cereal, Tumor O’s, while 
wearing a cell phone suit, and smoking Chernobyl Lites unfiltered, while 
making regular stops to your favorite snack joint, Agent Orange Julius, you get 
cancer, we cover it! 
Daily Show 2, supra note 14. 
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epidemiology. 
Toxic tort jurisprudence applies a framework tailor-made to 
accommodate the “dynamic process” of toxic exposure and the 
development of latent illness.
274
 It differs from traditional tort law, in 
which causation is inferred from the temporal sequence of events (i.e. 
the plaintiff was unharmed prior to the incident but was injured as a 
result of some action taken against him).
275
 In a toxic exposure case, the 
toxins often cause latent illness, which may take years to manifest, and 
likely involve intricate temporal and medical issues.
276
 Further 
complicating the analysis is the fact that the “background rate” of an 
illness must be weighed against the rate of illness in the population at 
large.
277
 A toxic exposure claimant must establish an association 
between the toxic exposure (i.e. WTC dust) and the development of the 
disease (cancer) and then determine whether the exposure is a 
contributing factor to “an additional burden of cancer” in this 
population.
278
 If the answer is “yes,” there is an “association.” 
279
 
Causation can then be inferred from the “association.” The following 
section explains this process in more detail.
280
 
 
274 Eggen Ground Zero, supra note 35, at 385. 
275 See Steve C. Gold, The “Restatement” of the False Negative Asymmetry in Toxic 
Tort Causation 37 WILLIAM MITCHEL L. REV. 1507, 1511 (2011) (quoting Hyman & 
Armstrong, P.S.C. v. Gunderson, 279 S.W.3d 93, 104 (Ky. 2008)). 
276 See, e.g., Eggen Ground Zero, supra note 35, at 385. 
277 Id. at 446 (explaining that generic illnesses may be caused by a variety of exposures 
or appear idiopathically). The “latency periods open up the possibility that intervening 
causes may be responsible for an illness that develops years after the exposure.” Id. at 446-
47. 
278 Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL 
ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 83, 335-36 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. ed., 2d ed. 2000). See, e.g., 
Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1176 (E.D. Wash. 2009) This 
does not address specific causation. Specific causation, or that particular plaintiff’s illness 
was caused by a substance, is not applicable in the context of the Zadroga Act because the 
WTCHP Administrator does not consider individual claims for cancer coverage. Therefore, 
the Administrator must examine the available peer-reviewed evidence in light of the eligible 
population, and not on an individual basis. See also In re World Trade Center Disaster Site 
Litig. 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 575 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2007). During the WTC settlement 
litigation, over 10,000 WTC cases were consolidated under Federal Rule 42 as a non-class 
mass action. The decision by Judge Hellerstein to certify the cases as a mass action, and not 
as a class action, eliminated the requirement that each individual plaintiff prove causation. 
See generally Alexandra N. Rothman, Bringing an End to the Trend: Cutting Judicial 
“Approval” and “Rejection” Out of Non-Class Mass Settlement, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 
(2011) for an excellent overview of mass action settlements and the WTC litigation. 
279 First Periodic Review, supra note 133, at 25-26. 
280 Id. 
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A. The Position of the Restatement Third Promotes A Flexible, 
But Not Relaxed, Causation Inquiry 
Epidemiologic evidence is one methodology used to establish an 
association between an exposure and a disease. In a toxic exposure case, 
such as the WTC exposure, “evidence consists of studies comparing the 
disease rate in groups of individuals. . . with varying levels of exposure. 
When a study finds a difference in the incidence of disease in the 
exposed and unexposed groups, an ‘association’ exists between 
exposure and disease.”
281
 A second type of study “identif[ies] toxic 
substances at the aggregate population level.”
282
 An “association” is 
found when there is “a higher incidence of disease in the group exposed 
to the substance.”
283
 
Once an association is found, the Bradford Hill criteria are used to 
determine whether or not a causal relationship can be inferred.
284
 The 
Hill Guidelines are frequently applied in cancer epidemiology when the 
number of studies is limited.
285
 The criteria evaluate (1) the consistency 
of the association, (2) the temporal relationship between the disease, (3) 
the posited cause, and (4) the coherence of the inference given existing 
scientific knowledge.
286
 Discussing the evaluation of studies, Comment c 
cautions that an algorithm does not exist for applying the Hill guidelines 
because concluding that an inference of causation is appropriate is a 
matter of informed judgment, not scientific methodology.
287
 
 
281 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. 
c(3) (2010). 
282 Id. 
283 Id. 
284 First Periodic Review, supra note 133, at 25-26. 
285 RESTATEMENT THIRD, § 28 cmt. c. See Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., 639 
F.3d 11, 13-17 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Michele Carbon et al., Modern Criteria to Establish 
Human Cancer Etiology, 64 CANCER RES. 5518, 5522 (2004)). 
286 See, e.g., Milward, 639 F.3d at 17. The Hill criteria include: the strength or 
frequency of the association; the consistency of the association in varied circumstances; the 
specificity of the association; the temporal relationship between the disease and the posited 
cause; the dose response curve between them; the biological plausibility of the causal 
explanation given existing scientific knowledge; the coherence of the explanation with 
generally known facts about the disease; the experimental data that relates to it; and the 
existence of analogous causal relationships. 
287 RESTATEMENT THIRD, § 28 cmt. c(3). 
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1. Recent Case Law Supports a Flexible Causation 
Inquiry When Epidemiologic Evidence is Limited 
Unless there is a substantial body of exonerative epidemiologic 
evidence, Comment c states that the causation analysis cannot alone rely 
on the quantity of epidemiological studies. Significantly, when the 
disease process has a long latency period: 
[S]tudies cannot be performed until the disease has manifested itself. 
As a consequence, some plaintiffs may be forced to litigate long 
before epidemiologic research is available. . . . Thus, most courts 
have appropriately declined to impose a threshold requirement that 
a plaintiff always must prove causation with epidemiologic 
evidence.
288
 
In these cases, a flexible approach is appropriate, as epidemiologic 
evidence is admissible, but not necessary to prove causation.
289
 
In line with the Restatement Third, a significant body of case law 
rejects the use of an epidemiological threshold for proving causation.
290
 
For example, in 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a 
ruling for summary judgment on the basis that the district court 
incorrectly demanded epidemiological studies when no studies were 
possible at the time of review.
291
 The court held that “peer reviewed 
scientific literature may be unavailable because the issue may be too 
particular, new, or of insufficiently broad interest, to be in the 
literature.”
292
 In these circumstances, the “inquiry must be flexible.”
293
 
In Lindquist, an agent-disease-causation fireman workers’ 
compensation case, the court held that “causation should [be] 
determined based upon the scientific evidence that is currently 
available” at the time of review.
294
 The Lindquist court reinstated a 
 
288 Id. (emphasis added). 
289 Id. These studies are also “expensive and can take considerable time to design, 
conduct, and publish.” Id. 
290 Id. See, e.g., Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 882-83 (10th Cir. 
2005) (specifying that epidemiology is not required to prove causation); Rider v. Sandoz 
Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2002); In re Berg Litig., 293 F.3d 1127, 1130 
(9th Cir. 2002); Hollander v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1211-12 (10th Cir. 
2002); Bonner v. ISP Tech., Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 929 (8th Cir. 2001); Kennedy v. Collagen 
Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1998); Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 389-
90 (2d Cir. 1998); Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 138-39 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
291 Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2010). 
292 Id. at 565. 
293 Id. 
294 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. 
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firefighter’s award of disability, holding that when scientific evidence is 
unavailable, “the judicial system does not have the leisure to defer 
decision until proper and definitive scientific or medical studies are 
available.”
295
 Further, “courts must not penalize workers suffering from 
diseases for which science has not yet clearly established causation.”
296
 
In 2011, Geraghty furthered Lindquist’s treatment of limited 
evidence.
297
 The court affirmed the decision to deny worker’s 
compensation, holding that “unlike the petitioner in Lindquist, Geraghty 
was not advancing a scientific theory of causation that has not yet 
reached general acceptance as neither expert suggested a lack of 
scientific basis for the impact of lung disease.”
298
 This case illustrates 
that the flexible approach praised by the Restatement Third is not 
synonymous with the relaxation of the court’s role as evidentiary 
gatekeeper.
299
 
2. A Flexible Standard Should be Adopted by the 
WTCHP Administrator 
The above jurisprudence indicates that if the issue of Ground Zero 
exposure and latent cancer were to be decided in a court of law, the lack 
of available epidemiologic evidence would not be outcome-
determinative. Following the precedent set by the Primiano and 
Lindquist courts, it is likely that the STAC recommendation and the 
Zeig-Owens study would be sufficiently persuasive to warrant 
providing some degree of cancer coverage. From a policy perspective, 
the language of Comment c specifies that an eligible individual should 
not be penalized for the lack of available research. 
When the possibility of causal connection is accepted, we cannot 
deny relief in all cases simply because science is unable decisively to 
dissipate the blur between possibility and probability. In such 
 
c(3) (2010) (citing Lindquist, 814 A.2d at 1069). 
295 Lindquist, 814 A.2d at 1090 (citing Magaw v. Middletown Bd. of Educ., 731 A.2d 
1196, 1203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)). 
296 Id. 
297 Geraghty v. Jersey City Mun. Utils. Auth , No. A-5467-09T2, 2011 N.J. Super. 
Unpub LEXIS 1337 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2011). 
298 Id. at *16-17. 
299 Compare id. with Hildy Bowbeer, Flying Trampolines and Falling Bookcases: 
Understanding the Third Restatement of Torts (Spring 2010), 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1034 (2011) (expressing concern that Comment c may direct a court to “relax its vigilance” 
as gatekeeper). 
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circumstances judges must do the best they can, with the hope that 
their decisions square with the truth, and with a willingness to 
consider in succeeding cases whatever contribution scientific 
advances may offer.
300
 
STAC member Dr. William Rom expressed a similar sentiment shortly 
after the STAC announcement: “[w]aiting for harder evidence that 
could still be years or decades away could mean that deserving people 
are denied care when they need it most. I just don’t think [first 
responders] can wait that long.”
301
 
B. All Reliable Evidence Should be Admissible for Consideration 
by the Administrator 
In toxic tort cases, reliable scientific, technical, or other 
specialized evidence is admissible to assist the trier of fact, typically a 
jury, in determining causation.
302
 Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, any testimony considered by the trier of fact must be “(1) 
based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony [must be] the product 
of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness [must apply] the 
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”
303
 The Daubert 
Court identified factors to aid judges in the determination of whether or 
not an expert’s testimony meets the element of reliability. The factors 
are: “(1) whether the theory of technique can be and has been tested; (2) 
whether the technique has been subject to peer review and publication; 
(3) the technique’s known or potential rate of error; and (4) the level of 
the theory or technique’s acceptance within the relevant discipline.”
304
 
However, courts are frequently criticized for applying the Daubert 
factors too broadly.
305
 The Daubert line of cases does not demand 
scientific certainty—the evidence of toxic causation must only be 
trustworthy in order for it to be admissible.
306
 Because of the many 
 
300 Lindquist, 814 A.2d at 1090. (citing Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 178 A.2d 161, 164-
65 (N.J. 1962)). 
301 Government panel favors some WTC cancer claims, Wall St. J. (Feb. 16, 2012), 
available at online.wsj.com/article/APc6e30a2ffd044fba8cc58b026669aa05.html. 
302 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993). 
303 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
304 United States v. Mooney, 315 F.3d 54, 62 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. 
579). 
305 See, e.g., Milward, 639 F.3d at 22 (holding that the district court took the demands 
of Daubert “too far”). 
306 See Gold, supra note 275, at 1537 n.147 (quoting Hyman & Armstrong, P.S.C. v. 
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different kinds of expertise and medical testimony, these factors should 
not be construed as “a definitive checklist or test.”
307
 For example, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court ruling 
excluding expert testimony on the basis of the expert’s failure to refer to 
peer-reviewed literature.
308
 While peer-reviewed literature is a factor for 
consideration under Daubert, the question of admissibility “must be tied 
to the facts of a particular case.”
309
 
Given the comparable case precedent, this Article recommends that 
the WTC Health Program Administrator be permitted to conduct a 
comprehensive analysis in which all reliable evidence is admissible, not 
just that found in peer-reviewed epidemiologic studies. A paradigm for 
this type of analysis is set forth in the 2011 case Milward v. Acuity 
Specialty Products Group, Inc. The plaintiff, suffering from acute 
promyelocytic leukemia (APL), claimed his disease was caused by 
workplace exposure to benzene—one of the same toxins present at the 
WTC.
310
 The lower court excluded the expert’s testimony and explained 
that it was unreliable because only five peer-reviewed studies had been 
published on this type of cancer.
311
 Citing Comment c, the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s judgment excluding the 
expert testimony for lack of peer-reviewed literature; it held that the 
testimony was reliable despite the lack of epidemiology.
312
 
The Milward case is analogous to the situation confronting 
Administrator Howard and the STAC; both situations involve latent 
illness and both have a limited body of available peer-reviewed 
 
Gunderson, 279 S.W.3d 93, 104 (Ky. 2008)). 
307 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999) (noting that there are 
“many different kinds of experts, and many different kinds of expertise,” and that as such 
these factors “may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability”). 
308 Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 721 (7th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, courts 
have incorrectly extended Daubert to demand scientific certainty when the evidence of toxic 
causation must only be trustworthy in order for it to be admissible. The judge’s role as 
gatekeeper does not extend to his or her being required to find the proffered opinion 
scientifically correct. See also Hyman, 278 S.W.3d at 105; King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe 
Ry. Co., 762 N.W.2d 24, 42-43 (Neb. 2009). 
309 Beaudette v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 462 F.3d 22, 25-26 (1st. Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150). 
310 Milward, 639 F.3d at 22. 
311 Id. 
312 See generally Milward, 639 F.3d 11. See Gold, supra note 275, at 1577 (noting that 
“Comment c offers courts the teaching of experts one step further removed, as they 
considered the issues in general, with no specific party’s legal rights riding on the 
outcome.”). 
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literature. However, unlike Howard, the Milward court was not 
constrained by statutory language. As such, Milward held that limited 
epidemiologic studies do not automatically render expert testimony 
inadmissible when the expert offers other reliable evidence supporting 
an inference of causal association.
313
 
In the Milward opinion, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
remanded the case for a jury trial and chastised the lower court for 
“read[ing] too much into the paucity of epidemiological studies” when 
the issue is “currently the focus of extensive scientific research and 
debate.”
314
 Embracing Comment c, the court reiterated that 
epidemiological studies are not per se required as a condition of 
admissibility.
315
 When peer-reviewed evidence “does not exist and is not 
reasonably available” other “probative evidence” should be given full 
consideration.
316
 
If the WTC Health Program cancer issue was evaluated using the 
standard in Milward, the Administrator would be permitted to consider 
all reliable evidence, including physician testimony, case studies, and 
the environmental findings, with the Administrator adopting the role of 
juror. 
The Milward court also provides useful guidance for weighing 
evidence, an element that is lacking in the Zadroga Act. It endorsed the 
“weight of the evidence” approach, which encompasses the Bradford 
Hill methodology.
317
 The weight of the evidence methodology requires 
the scientist to: 
(1) identify an association between an exposure and a disease; 
(2) consider a range of plausible explanations for the association; 
(3) rank the rival explanations according to their plausibility; 
(4) seek additional evidence to separate the more plausible from the 
less plausible explanations; 
(5) consider all of the relevant plausible explanations; and 
(6) integrate the evidence using professional judgment to come to a 
conclusion about the best explanation.
318
 
According to toxic tort experts, “the court of appeals issued the 
 
313 Milward, 639 F.3d  at 13-17. 
314 Id. at 23-24. 
315 Id. at 23. 
316 See id. at 23; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c(3) (2010). 
317 See Milward, 639 F.3d at 17. 
318 Id. at 18. 
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strongest and most explicit judicial endorsement to date of the weight of 
the evidence methodology for proof of causation in a toxic tort case.”
319
 
Unlike courts that have equated the absence of quantitative analysis 
with the absence of scientific rigor, the First Circuit embraced Comment 
c’s position that the “saliency of other evidence of causation often 
entails considerable [scientific] judgment.”
320
 The Zadroga Act should, 
as a matter of equity, be amended to include a formal procedure for 
weighing evidence like that accepted in Milward. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The tenth anniversary of the terrorist attack serves as a stark 
reminder that first responders are still feeling the reverberations as 
though it were yesterday. The methodology presented in this Article 
will better ensure a fair determination of whether cancer warrants 
inclusion in the WTC Health Program. If WTC Health Program 
Administrator Howard adheres to the statutory guidelines, the Zeig-
Owens study is the only work meeting both the peer-reviewed 
stipulation and the temporal proximity needed to adequately assess 
latent cancer. Therefore, Administrator Howard should consider the 
forward-thinking approach exemplified in Comment c’s analysis of 
causation in cases of limited epidemiology. As expressed in Milward, 
peer-review should not per se be required as a condition of 
admissibility.
321
 
In his 2011 book, City of Dust, Anthony DePalma wrote: 
We do know that the doubts sown in the very earliest days have been 
long lasting. What might have been a sentinel case of emergency 
response that raised an entire nation from its knees instead became 
an endless cycle of bickering, mistrust, sickness, and uncertainty as 
officials tried to deflect blame, responders became crusaders for 
themselves, lawyers sought to make courtroom history, and emotions 
that had never before been felt rose to the surface.
322
 
It is the hope of this Author that 2012 marks the end of the 
destructive behavior so eloquently captured in the words above and 
echoed in the debate surrounding the Zadroga Act. Expressing the 
sentiment of so many World Trade Center survivors, Stanley Mieses 
 
319 Gold, supra note 275, at 1577. 
320 RESTATEMENT THIRD, § 28 cmt. c(3). 
321 See Milward, 639 F.3d at 23. 
322 DEPALMA, supra note 102, at 116. 
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said, “I tend to think of 9/11 as the trapdoor that opened up. Whatever 
else I’m doing past that, is climbing back up.”
323
 Let’s hope the Zadroga 
Bill eases this climb. 
AUTHOR’S NOTE 
After this Article went to press, the Administrator exercised his 
option to add fourteen categories of cancer to the Zadroga Act’s List of 
Covered Conditions.
324
 The final rule included fifty-eight cancers and 
went into effect on October 12, 2012.
325
 
The Administrator’s arguments for including cancer mirror many 
of the recommendations in this Article. In an about-face from the first 
Periodic Review, the Administrator identified the need for a broader 
decision-making process and agreed that limited peer-reviewed 
evidence should not be an absolute barrier to cancer’s inclusion on the 
List.
326
 The methodology suggested by the Administrator utilizes the 
practical approach taken in Comment C and will better ensure an 
equitable review of 9/11-related health conditions. 
The Administrator began the process of adding the cancers three 
months after the STAC released their formal recommendation.
327
 Section 
3312(a)(6) of the Public Health Service Act required that the 
Administrator conduct rulemaking to formally add a condition to the 
List.
328
 The notice of proposed rulemaking, published by Health and 
Human Services (“HHS”) on June 13, 2012, sought comments and 
feedback on the methodology used to evaluate evidence of cancer and 
on the proposed cost estimates associated with adding cancer 
coverage.
329
 In response, HHS received twenty-seven substantive 
 
323 Hartocollis, 10 Years and a Diagnosis Later, 9/11 Demons Haunt Thousands, supra 
note 4, at A20. 
324 World Trade Center Health Program; Addition of Certain Types of Cancer to the 
List of WTC-Related Health Conditions, 77 Fed. Reg. 56138 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 88). 
325 See id. for a complete listing of the types of cancers now included on the List. See 
also 42 C.F.R. 88.1 (2011). 
326 See generally World Trade Center Health Program; Addition of Certain Types of 
Cancer to the List of WTC-Related Health Conditions, 77 Fed. Reg. 56138 (Sept. 12, 2012) 
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 88). 
327 Id. at 56140. 
328 James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-347, 
124 Stat. 3623 (2011) (amending Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. ch. 6A (2001) by 
adding § 3312). 
329 World Trade Center Health Program; Addition of Certain Types of Cancer to the 
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submissions from a variety of stakeholders, including labors unions 
representing WTC responders, physicians specializing in 9/11 health 
care, and the WTC Health Program Survivors Steering Committee.
330
 
Individual first responders, survivors, and the families of those who 
have already died from 9/11-related cancer also submitted a number of 
comments.
331
 The majority of comments were centered on preserving an 
equitable review process, ensuring that the WTC Health Program is not 
abused, and creating a methodology that is scientifically prudent.
332
 
The final rulemaking adopts a methodology that uses a hierarchy 
of four methods to determine whether or not to add cancers or types of 
cancer.
333
 In making this determination, the evidentiary review must 
demonstrate fulfillment of at least one of the four methods, listed below 
in order of preference: 
 Method 1: Epidemiological Studies of September 11, 2001 
Exposed Populations 
 Method 2: Established Causal Associations 
 Method 3: Review of Evaluations of Carcinogenicity in 
Humans 
 Method 4: Review of Information Provided by the WTC 
Health Program Scientific/Technical Advisory Committee.
334
 
Method 1, the most traditional method, is the criteria initially 
outlined in the language of the Zadroga Act.
335
 Under Method 1, a type 
of cancer can “be added to the List if published, peer-reviewed 
epidemiologic evidence supports a causal association between 9/11 
exposures and the cancer type.”
336
 As recommended in this Article, the 
Administrator will use the Bradford Hill criteria to evaluate the 
 
List of WTC-Related Health Conditions; Proposed Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 35574 (June 13, 
2012). 
330 World Trade Center Health Program; Addition of Certain Types of Cancer to the 
List of WTC-Related Health Conditions, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56140. 
331 Id. 
332 Id. at 56144-47. 
333 Id at 56142. 
334 Id. 
335 James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-347, 
124 Stat. 3623 (2011) (amending Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. ch. 6A (2001) by 
adding § 3312). See also World Trade Center Health Program; Addition of Certain Types of 
Cancer to the List of WTC-Related Health Conditions, 77 Fed. Reg. 56138, 56142 (Sept. 12, 
2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 88). 
336 World Trade Center Health Program; Addition of Certain Types of Cancer to the 
List of WTC-Related Health Conditions, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56142. 
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exposure-cancer relationship.
337
 The strength of the association, the 
consistency of findings over multiple studies, the biological gradient 
(dose-response relationship) between the exposure and the type of 
cancer, and the biological plausibility will be considered.
338
 When only 
one peer-reviewed study is available, the strength association must 
“place greater emphasis on statistical significance than on the 
magnitude of the effect.”
339
 As such, Method 1 is most useful when there 
is a large body of research available.
340
 
If Method 1 cannot determine a causal relationship, the 
Administrator will consider the condition under Method 2.
341
 Under 
Method 2, a type of cancer may be added to the List if there is “well-
established scientific support published in multiple  epidemiologic 
studies” showing a causal relationship between a health condition 
already covered by the List and the development of cancer.
342
 In other 
words, it relies on the medical relationship between a WTC-health 
condition (i.e. inflammation) and the development of a certain type of 
cancer.
343
 
Method 1 and Method 2 provide the most scientific certainty and 
are recognized as traditional methodologies for determining causation.
344
 
However, as this Article indicates, these Methods are “substantially 
limited in their ability to provide timely guidance” on whether or not an 
association exists.
345
 Relying only on epidemiological evidence is not an 
equitable method for apportioning care. In the final rule-making, the 
Administrator likewise argues that “[w]aiting for definitive 
scientifically-unassailable epidemiological results before adding types 
of cancer to the List would prevent treatment of currently-enrolled 
WTC responders and survivors.”
346
 In addition to the temporal 
impossibilities, the Administrator also cites difficulties with such small 
 
337 Id. 
338 Id. 
339 Id. 
340 Id. at 56143-45. 
341 Id. 
342 World Trade Center Health Program; Addition of Certain Types of Cancer to the 
List of WTC-Related Health Conditions, 77 Fed. Reg. 56138, 56142 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 88). 
343 Id. 
344 Id. at 56145-47. 
345 Id. at 56145. 
346 Id. 
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sample sizes and the rarity of many cancers as reasons to explore other 
methodologies, albeit with less scientific certainty.
347
 As such, Methods 
3 and 4 are available when epidemiologic evidence is not. 
Method 3 determines causation by evaluating the risk of 
carcinogenicity from a certain compound or toxin.
348
 In order to add a 
cancer under this Method, the agent (i.e. pollutant or toxin) must be 
documented as part of 9/11 exposures and must also be categorized as a 
human carcinogen.
349
 The Method further specifies that the National 
Toxicology Program must determine that the 9/11 agent is known or 
reasonably anticipated to be a carcinogen and the International Agency 
for Research on Cancer must determine that “there is sufficient or 
limited evidence that the 9/11 agent causes a type of cancer.”
350
 The 
reliability of Method 3 stems from previous scientific scrutiny—toxic 
agents have long been the subject of numerous studies regarding their 
carcinogenic properties and are known to cause specific cancers in 
humans. 
Method 4 is the final opportunity to establish causation between 
9/11 exposure and cancer.  Unlike the previous Methods, which rely on 
scientific data, Method 4 relies on other relevant evidentiary sources. 
When determining whether the occurrence of cancer is related to 9/11 
exposure, this Method evaluates whether or not the STAC has a 
reasonable basis for its recommendation.
351
 Because the STAC evaluates 
all types of evidence, including non-peer reviewed data (i.e. case studies 
and pubic commentary), this Method is not limited to statistical 
significance. For example, the STAC recommended that childhood 
cancers be covered because children are especially vulnerable to cancer, 
drink more water, breathe more air, and have overall higher 
environmental exposure than adults. 
352
 As further evidence supporting 
coverage, the STAC noted that the excess risks will likely go unnoticed 
in epidemiologic studies.
353
 Given these arguments, childhood cancers 
(cancers diagnosed in persons under twenty years of age) are being 
 
347 Id. 
348 World Trade Center Health Program; Addition of Certain Types of Cancer to the 
List of WTC-Related Health Conditions, 77 Fed. Reg. 56138, 56145 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 88). 
349 Id. at 56142. 
350 Id. at 56142-45. 
351 Id. at 56142. 
352 2012 Recommendation, supra note 64 at 25-26. 
353 Id. 
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added to the List using Method 4.
354
 
As with so many 9/11-related matters, the cancer conundrum is 
much more complicated than it appears—simply amending the List will 
not guarantee coverage. The next hurdle is cost. To date, the WTC 
Health Program has 55,000 participating first responders and anticipates 
enrolling an additional 25,000 first responders through 2016—for those 
needing cancer treatments under the Zadroga Act, the budget for 
providing this coverage is a serious concern.
355
 The cost analysis in the 
Final Rule report estimates that WTC Health Program cancer coverage 
will cost $147,496,066 by 2016.
356
 This estimate included four years of 
cancer treatment and assumed an incidence of cancer 21 percent higher 
than the average U.S. population cancer rate.
357
 The 21 percent increase 
in cancer development for those with 9/11 exposure was derived from 
the data in the Zeig-Owens study and is considered a possible 
outcome.
358
 
An immediate financial concern is the significant loss of funding 
from the possible automatic sequestration of federal funds in 2013.
359
 
Should Congress fail to enact deficit-cutting measures by January 2, 
2013, approximately $118 million will be cut from the WTC Health 
Program—every dollar of which is needed to cover the cost of cancer 
treatment.
360
 An estimated $38 million will be cut in 2013 alone.
361
 
 
354 Id. See also World Trade Center Health Program; Addition of Certain Types of 
Cancer to the List of WTC-Related Health Conditions, 77 Fed. Reg. 56138, 56142 (Sept. 12, 
2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 88) (stating that certain cancer types “may be added to 
the List if the STAC has provided a reasonable basis for adding a type of cancer and the 
basis for inclusion does not meet the criteria for Method 1, Method 2, or Method 3.”). 
355 World Trade Center Health Program; Addition of Certain Types of Cancer to the 
List of WTC-Related Health Conditions, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56147-48. 
356 Id. at 56154, Table H. 
357 Id. at 56151. 
358 Id. at 56148 (as opposed to characterizing it as a “likely” outcome).  The cost to 
cover cancer under the Zadroga Act will alter the amount distributed under the re-opened 
Victim’s Compensation Fund. The Special Master is currently considering how to best 
prorate the share of claims for those now eligible for compensation as a result of cancer 
coverage. This may result in a smaller claim for claimants with non-cancer conditions. 
359 9/11 Responders May Face Deep Cuts in Zadroga Funds, WNYC.ORG, (Oct. 15, 
2012), available at http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/2012/oct/15/911-responders-
face-deep-cuts-if-zadroga-act-isnt-exempt/. See also Joseph Orovic, Crowley: Reverser 
Zadroga Act Cuts, QUEENS CHRONICLE, Nov. 8, 2012. 
360 Press Release, N.Y. State Representative Carolyn B. Maloney, Representatives 
Maloney, Nadler, and King Pledge Bipartisan Effort Against Sequestration of 9/11 Health 
& Victim Compensation Funds, (Sept. 20, 2012), available at 
http://maloney.house.gov/press-release/representatives-maloney-nadler-king-pledge-
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Overall, the total cuts to the Zadroga Act will reach $329 million by 
2016, which would be devastating to the WTC Health Program’s ability 
to provide care.
362
 
The following is a bipartisan plea by the three U.S. Representatives 
who fought for the Zadroga Act for nearly a decade: 
Considering how long it took Congress to act, we cannot allow those 
receiving the care they need and deserve from the Zadroga Act to be 
stranded by a sequester. This is one of the many compelling and 
urgent reasons why we pledge to work together in a bipartisan 
manner to prevent deficit cuts from jeopardizing these vital 
programs.
363
 
On behalf of those first responders dependent on the WTC Health 
Program for cancer treatment, this Author could not agree more. 
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